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When a performer approaches a score with the goal of crafting an interpretation, 
certain values are invariably assigned. The performer determines which edit on of a score 
he will use, tempo relationships, dynamic ranges, and the meaning he will assign to the 
composer’s notation. While composers have sought for all of recorded music history to 
make notation ever clearer, the truth remains that music is highly resistant to confinement 
in dots, lines, squiggles, and expressive terms. The performer must assign meani g to the 
notation based on his personal experience and knowledge every time he crafts an 
interpretation. This meaning encompasses aesthetic elements, musical ge tures, and 
phrasing decisions. Thus, when performers discuss interpretation, there remains little of 
the score that has not been affected either consciously or unconsciously by the 
performer’s subjective decisions. In music that includes extra-musical meaning, the 
situation becomes even more difficult. The performer must make decisions about musical 
notation, extra-musical programs, paratexts, performance practice, performance traditions, 
and what constitutes the “score” his performance must conform to.  
Franz Liszt’s Sonata in B minor esides at the crux of arguments over absolute 
and program music, aesthetic judgment, and interpretation. In order to negotiate betwe n 
competing philosophies and interpretive traditions, one must construct a more nuanced 
description of the relationships between score, interpretation, performance, paratxt, nd 
aesthetic response. This study approaches the Sonata from a Faustian perspectiv  using 
codes of aesthetic response to match major thematic and formal ideas with major 






















Determining Absolute and Program Music 
 
 
When a performer approaches a score with the goal of crafting an interpretation, 
certain values are invariably assigned. The performer determines which edit on of a score 
he will use, tempo relationships, dynamic ranges, and the meaning he will assign to the 
composer’s notation. Generally, notation is not absolutely specific. While composers 
have sought for all of recorded music history to make notation ever clearer, the truth 
remains that music is highly resistant to confinement in dots, lines, squiggles, and prosaic 
terms. The performer has to assign meaning to the notation based on his personal 
experience and knowledge every time he crafts an interpretation. This meaning 
encompasses aesthetic elements, musical gestures, and phrasing decisions. Thus, when 
performers discuss interpretation, often there remains little of the score that has not been 
affected either consciously or unconsciously by the performer’s subjective decisions.  
 The nineteenth-century saw a concerted effort to increase the meaningfulness of 
the musical experience by incorporating extra-musical elements with the score in 
program music. This led to a debate about music’s meaning in general, and how program 




 Vera Micznik, in discussing traditional analytical models for program music, 
states, 
Traditionally, studies of programmatic works separated  
analytical issues from those of history, taxonomy, aesthetics  
or genre. On the analytical side, discussions generally  
followed two main approaches: the formalist (or absolutist)  
approach, which took no account of programs, thus implicitly  
fostering the idea of programmatic pieces as “pure musical”  
structure; and the programmatic approach, which took  
agreement between the programmatic and musical ideas as  
its premise, thus endeavoring to bring to light the flawless  
workings of this equivalence.1 
 
While these traditional models distinguish between an “absolute” approach to analysis 
and a “programmatic” approach to analysis, it does not necessarily follow that the 
composers were drawing the same distinctions in their works. In fact, at the beginning of 
the nineteenth-century, these distinctions were not generally made.  
The historical reality that any music, programmatic or not,  
was perceived as expressing larger, extramusical ideas led  
Dahlhaus (and others) to speculate that 'absolute and  
program music do not form two classes in which one can  
divide instrumental music; rather, they represent opposing  
extremes . . . [of the] musical reality [which] widens itself  
in numerous transitional forms between the ideal types of  
absolute and program music'.2 
As these distinctions generally served later attempts to either validate or denigrate 
program music in some way, the polemical tendency of such analyses often pushed the 
interpreter’s agenda to the fore. For Liszt, music served as a bridge between both realms 
with strict absolute and program music serving as boundary markers.  
 While perhaps composers such as Babbitt (with his emphasis on computer-
produced music) could lay claim to truly absolute music, practically speaking, “absolute 
                                                
1 Vera Micznik, “The Absolute Limitations of Programme Music: The Case of Liszt’s ‘Die Ideale’,”  Music 
& Letters, Vol. 80, No. 2 (May, 1999): 207. 
2 Ibid., 209. 
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music” remains a theoretical idea (akin to absolute zero) when referring to Lisz ’s music. 
Music was still very much linked to the listener’s emotional response and therefore could 
not be considered purely absolute. At the same time, since one could often point to a 
strong formal logic governing specifically musical relationships independent of a y 
program, the music could not be considered purely programmatic either.  
 Because Liszt’s music exists between these two extremes, employing a one-
dimensional analysis (either analyzing the program music along the same lines as vocal 
music, or dispensing with the program and focusing on purely musical considerations) 
cannot do justice to the relationship between the two. In order to do so, the analysis must 
account for the different dimensions of Liszt’s music. 
 
 
The Three Dimensional Liszt 
 
 
 When analyzing Liszt, in addition to dealing with musical relationships and any 
programmatic relationships, one must also account for the idea of sublime beauty: an 
important issue for nineteenth century composers. In his article “Schumann and Romantic 
Distance,” Hoeckner references Jean-Paul Richter’s claim that  
The Romantic is beauty without limit, or beautiful infinity,  
just as there is a sublime infinity. . . . It is more than an  
analogy to call the Romantic the undulating hum of a  
vibrating string or bell, whose sound waves fade away into 
ever greater distances and finally are lost in ourselves, and  
which, although outwardly silent, still sound within.3 
 
Sublime beauty, or beauty that sublates the listener to a higher, more ennobled state, was 
the antithesis of the mere titillating beauty found in much of the philistine virtuosity that 
                                                
3 Berthold Hoeckner, “Schumann and Romantic Distance,” Journal of the American Musicological Society, 
Vol. 50, No. 1 (Spring, 1997): 60. 
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Schumann especially abhorred.4 While Liszt was not above playing to the gallery, he 
remained concerned that his serious works communicate something more meaningful 
than mere kitsch. Indeed, while Liszt perhaps compulsively employed “charlatan” 
virtuosic tricks even in his serious works, one still finds a transcendence of charlatan 
virtuosity to sublime beauty. In his own way, Liszt was an heir to Beethoven’s use of
extraordinarily simple materials for profound effect. Rather than transcending “simple” 
tonal materials, Liszt used his “charlatan” virtuosity to transcend meaningless brilliance 
into profound significance.  
For Liszt, program music was conceived as a means of providing a more powerful 
means of sublation and a stronger link to profound poetic ideas. Dahlhaus, in discussing 
the genesis of Liszt’s symphonic poems, describes the fusion of poetics with music: 
 The “poetics” of the symphonic poem came about as a  
solution to three interrelated problems. First, Liszt attempted  
to adopt the classical ideal of the symphony without yielding  
to a derivative dependence on its traditional formal scheme.  
Second, he wished to elevate program music, which he  
regarded, in Franz Brendel’s phrase, as the “forefront of  
historical evolution,” from a base, “picturesque” genre to  
poetic and philosophical sublimity. And finally, he was  
obsessed by the thought that it had to be possible to unite the  
expressive gestures of his earlier piano pieces, inspired by  
French romanticism, with the tradition of thematic and  
motivic manipulation.5 
 
The three-dimensional aspect of Liszt’s B minor Sonata becomes clear when view d
through the lens of the symphonic poem. The formal structure, while not entirely original, 
                                                
4 As Schumann states in his Aphorisms, “People say ‘it pleased,’ or ‘it did not please.’ As if there were 
nothing higher than the art of pleasing the public!”  
 Robert, Schumann, “Aphorisms” in Composers on Music: Eight Centuries of Writings, 2nd edition, edited 
by Josiah Fisk (Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press, 1997), 96. 
5 Carl Dahlhaus, Nineteenth-Century Music, translated by J. Bradford Robinson (Berkley, CA: University 
of California Press, 1989), 238. 
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was specifically titled a sonata. While Schumann (and Schubert) had already usd a 
similar structure in composing Fantasies, the distinction in formal labeling demonstrates a 
difference in conception.6 For Liszt, the importance of creating new, non-derivatively 
dependent models for sonata design was extremely important. The sonata’s stagnant state 
in the mid-nineteenth century vexed both Schumann and Liszt, but whereas the former 
attempted to conserve classical sonata design, Liszt attempted to retool the f rm more 
liberally.  
 While some might view Liszt’s inclusion of programmatic materi l as compulsive, 
his inclusion of programs was most often meant to convey greater insight into musical 
relationships rather than apologize for a lack of specific musical cogency. Dahlhaus 
writes:  
Liszt sought recourse in programs from a hybrid notion that  
music should inherit the legacy of… literature; this was  
part of his attempt to give music, conceived as a language, a  
distinctness lacking in absolute music with its vague 
intimations and allusions.7 
 
Programs, in other words, were meant to describe more completely the musical 
relationships of a particular work. Programs were not meant to supersede musical 
relationships, or intercede on behalf of musical relationships.8 In um, the programs were 
not fanciful labels for musical effects, but rather meaningful aesthetic d scriptions of the 
musical experience. 
 Finally, Liszt’s aim of reconciling the German tradition of thematic and motivic 
                                                
6 In The Romantic Generation, Charles Rosen describes Schumann’s Fantasy for Piano and Orchestra, 
Schubert’s Wanderer Fantasy, and the Finale from Beethoven’s Symphony n . 9 as models of formal 
structures that combine four-movement and single-move ent forms. 
Charles Rosen, The Romantic Generation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 480. 
7 Carl Dahlhaus, Nineteenth-Century Music, 241. 
8 One must forgive Liszt’s tendency to view music as a universally understood language. While a popular 
notion before the twentieth-century, it became a viewpoint that ethnomusicologists have disproved. 
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manipulation with French Romanticism offers insight into Liszt’s inclusion of both 
dramatic effect and thematic organicism in his sonata. The pursuit of effects, rather than 
being lamentable moments where Liszt devolves into cheap, charlatan immaturity, is 
every bit as important as the pursuit of rigorous motivic and thematic organicism. Liszt’s 
writing was never meant to be “in the manner of Beethoven” nor was he particularly 
interested in being the savior of German music. More alchemist than chemist, Liszt was 
attempting to create new paradigms of musical thought and expression.  
In conclusion, Liszt’s use of programmatic material was neither haphazard nor 
compulsive. Liszt was very clear about what he intended program music for and proposed 
a model for program music that applied to both proactively and retroactively designed 
programs.9 Liszt wrote,  
In program music… the return, change, modification, and  
modulation of the motives are conditioned by their relation  
to a poetic idea… All exclusively musical considerations,  
though they should not be neglected, have to be  
subordinated to the action of the given subject. 10 
 
Liszt’s program music exists in three dimensions: the relationship of the music to itself; 
the relationship of the music to the poetic idea; and the transcendental sublimation of 
both musical and poetic boundaries. Micznik writes,  
According to the metaphysical concept of musical poetics  
which characterized the first half of the nineteenth century,  
instrumental music was 'purely poetic' precisely because it  
lacked a definite subject, object and purpose, an absence  
that let the music speak out by itself, pure and unclouded.11  
 
Because music was already considered capable of conveying meaning even without a 
                                                
9 Proactively designed program refers here to a program that spawns a musical piece. A retroactively 
designed program refers to one applied to a piece of music already written. 
10 Quoted in: Frederich Niecks, Programme Music in the Last Four Centuries: A Contribution to the 
History of Musical Expression (New York, NY: Novello and Company Ltd., 1907), 280- 1. 
11 Vera Micznik, “The Absolute Limitations of Programme Music: The Case of Liszt’s ‘Die Ideale,’ 210. 
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definite subject, object, or purpose, the specific articulation of these poetic ideas d  not 
lower music to the level of mere descriptive language (a misunderstanding of many 
future programmatic composers), but rather allowed music to transcend the poetic idea – 
the poetic idea acting as a point of origin for musical meaning. Therefore, as the poetic 
idea did not “create” the music (but only conditioned the interpreter’s understanding), 
programs could be applied either proactively or retroactively and still retain the features 
of Liszt’s programmatic ideal. Schumann’s piano cycles therefore (where titl s were 
added afterwards to the music) employ programs in the same meaningful way as Liszt’s 
programmatic works.12 
 Given Liszt’s penchant for programs and metaphor (regardless of a piece’s 
“absolute” or “programmatic” designation), the interpreter must determine how each 
dimension exists in tension with the others. Only once each dimension has been fully 
explored can the interpreter be certain of a truthful rendering. 
                                                
12 It is important to draw a clear line however between programs that composers associate with music and 
programs later associated with music by listeners. While any listener-associated program will still condition 
a listener’s perception of the piece, it will have changed the listener’s objective phenomenal perception of 
the score.  Any further attempt to sublimate that poetic idea through the music based on this corrupted 







Schopenhauer: Program Music and the Question of Primacy 
 
 
 Schopenhauer, in his work The World as Will and Representation, offered a view 
of music that at once dispelled the notion that music was secondary to text or drama, and 
set music above all other arts in its direct communication of the Will.13  
  Music is in no way, like the other arts, an image of  
  Ideas, but an image of the very will of which Ideas are also  
  the objectivization. Just for this reason, the effect of music  
  is so very much more powerful and penetrating than that of  
  the other arts. For the latter speak only of shadows; it, rather,   
  speaks of the essence of things.14  
 
Schopenhauer’s view of the creative continuum was thus broken into two distinct groups: 
WILL  → IDEA → ART; and WILL  → MUSIC. In art, the IDEA is the representation of the 
WILL  but remains abstract and intangible. ART, as the tangible image of the IDEA, may 
communicate the WILL  but only indirectly. It remains twice removed from the WILL,  
only a reflection of the IDEA. Schopenhauer describes music on the other hand in direct 
connection to the WILL . MUSIC is a composite, both abstract and tangible. As a 
spontaneous representation of the WILL , MUSIC requires no middle stage. Rather, MUSIC 
retains the unique property among the arts (according to Schopenhauer) to sublimate the 
WILL directly into tangible reality. Through describing music as being the sole expr ssion 
of the Will, Schopenhauer endowed nineteenth-century instrumental musicians with the 
responsibility of being the guardians of the Will’s purest possible expression. While this 
                                                
13 Schopenhauer defines the Will as the essential, inner substance that creates life. Life is merely an 
objectivization of the Will. 
14Arthur Schopenhauer, The World As Will And Representation, vol. 1, 1819, translated by Richard E. 
Aquila, David Carus (Boston, MA: Pearson Education Inc., 2008), 308. 
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new authority provided immediate philosophical legitimacy for purely instrumental 
music, it proved problematic for program music. 
  [Music] cannot be imitation mediated by conscious  
  intention, through concepts. Otherwise, music does not  
  express the inner essence, will itself, but only imitates its  
  phenomenon in an unsatisfactory way, as is done by all  
  strictly representational music…which is altogether  
  objectionable.15  
 
 On the one hand, the idea of music as representing (something) implies that all 
music is program music. However, the nineteenth century perhaps offers the most (good 
and bad) examples of explicitly representational music. According to Schopenhauer, such 
consciously illustrative music loses its primacy of place as immediately expressive of the 
Will. Any music composed for the purpose of representing an extra-musical program 
forms part of a new creative continuum: WILL  → IDEA → ART → (PROGRAM) MUSIC. 
This new continuum removes music from the Will by a factor of three. As such, MUSIC is 
no longer in immediate relationship to the WILL , but instead becomes only a copy of the 
reflection (ART) of the representation (IDEA) of the WILL . All program music therefore 
must be summarily rejected as being a mere imitation of true music.  
 Franz Liszt, no stranger to controversy, was the foremost champion of program 
music in the nineteenth-century. As such, he was dogged by attacks on his compositinal 
ability that frequently implied he needed programs for his music in order to supplement a 
dearth of creative gifts.  
  
                                                
15Arthur Schopenhauer, The World As Will And Representation, 314-15. 
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Mendelssohn wrote in 1840,  
  I have never seen a musician whose feeling for music filled  
  him to the very fingertips and flowed directly out from them,  
  as it does with Liszt; and with this directness and his  
  immense technique and practice he would leave all others  
  far behind were it not that, for all that, original ideas are still  
  the most important thing; and these nature appears – so far  
  at least – to have denied him, so that in this respect most of  
  the other great virtuosi equal or even surpass him.16 
While Mendelssohn seems to have been referring primarily to Liszt’s interpretations, the 
same charge would subsequently be leveled at Liszt regarding his compositions when he 
sought to recast his image as a serious composer. Liszt did indeed write music that must 
fall within the definition of mere illustrative music. To take these works as exemplars of 
his program music, however, would be a mistake. His concept of program music 
remained much more complex than samples of his “gallery” music might otherwise 
suggest.  
 For Liszt, program music was not an attempt to buttress weak compositions with 
textual illustration, but rather an attempt to employ music in transcending the poetic idea 
and communicating more directly with the listener. As stated previously, Lizt’s opinion 
was that:  
In program music… the return, change, modification, and  
modulation of the motives are conditioned by their relation  
to a poetic idea… All exclusively musical considerations,  
though they should not be neglected, have to be  
subordinated to the action of the given subject. 17 
 
As such, music does not become a mere copy of the art providing the program, but 
instead transcends the original poetic idea by becoming a composite of both musical 
                                                
16 Felix Mendelssohn “Letter to his mother, Frankfurt, June 2, 1837” Composers on Music, ed. Josiah Fisk 
(Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press, 1997), 86. 
17 Quoted by: Frederich Niecks, Programme Music in the Last Four Centuries, 280-81. 
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relationships to each other, and musical relationships to the poetic idea. Thus program 
music could transcend both the program and the music. The result was that an explicit 
program ceased to be necessary to the original conception of the music and could be 
applied both proactively and retroactively without diminishing the score. Composers 
could either offer or withhold the program (as in Mendelssohn’s Songs Without Words). 
In writing program music in which the program served to add extra-musical meaning to 
musical meaning, Liszt side-stepped Schopenhauer’s position that program music must 
be merely imitative. The program, rather than serving as the impetus for a composition, 
instead became a paratext to the music.  
 
Paratexts: Programs at Large 
 
 
In his book Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation, Genette defines paratexts as follows: 
  More than a boundary or sealed border, the paratext is,  
  rather, a threshold or…a “vestibule” that offers the world at  
  large the possibility of either stepping inside or turning back.  
  It is an “undefined zone” between the inside and the outside,  
  a zone without any hard and fast boundary on either the  
  inward side (turned toward the text) or the outward side  
  (turned toward the world’s discourse about the text), an  
  edge, or, as Philippe Lejeune put it, “a fringe of the printed  
  text which in reality controls one’s whole reading of the text.”18  
 
In music, a paratext may thus be defined as: that text which, while not part of the original 
score, may be associated with the score and may thus come to inform one’s interpretation 
of the score. A paratext is different from a program inasmuch as the program must be 
referenced by the original score either in the score itself or as an approved supplement to 
the score (as with a preface). Titles, literary quotations, dedications, indeed anything 
                                                
18 Gerard Genette, Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation, translated by Jane E. Lewin (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 1-2. 
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implying more than musical relationships, may invest a score with a program.19 The 
paratext however, is less rigorously defined and functions more as a useful atmosphere in 
which to interpret the text rather than a method of procedure.   
 Since the paratext does not reside in the score itself, there remains the problem of 
assigning lineage and therefore value to any particular paratext. Genette writes, “By 
definition, something is not a paratext unless the author or one of his associates accepts 
responsibility for it, although the degree of responsibility may vary.”20 In regard to music, 
two types of paratext prove most useful: The official paratext, and the unofficial paratext. 
Genette states, 
  The official is any paratextual message openly accepted by  
  the author [composer] or publisher or both – a message for  
  which the author or publisher cannot evade responsibility 
  ….The unofficial (or semiofficial) is most of the author’s  
  epitext: interviews, conversations, and confidences,  
  responsibility for which the author can always more or less  
  disclaim with denials.21 
 
In general, almost all legitimate theoretical analysis regarding historical interpretation, 
associated extra-musical content, and performance practice falls under the official 
category of paratext. The titles of Schumann’s piano cycle Carnaval for instance form an 
official paratext for both individual pieces and the work as a whole. The titles are placed 
within the score by Schumann himself, and therefore satisfy the requirements of a 
official paratext.22 
                                                
19 While on the surface this definition of programmatic content works, it must be noted that this premis is 
not rigorous as expressive indications often use extramusical imagery (for example allegro con fuoco), thus 
creating a rather undefined zone. 
20 Gerard Genette, Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation, 9. 
21 Ibid., 10 
22 While Robert Schumann later in life attempted to remove all paratextual elements from his works – part 
of his campaign to classicize his compositions – the original forms including paratexts have been 
determined by mainstream history to be authoritative.   
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 The designation of Beethoven’s Sonata Op. 31, No. 2 as the Tempest refers to a 
remark of Beethoven “recorded” by Schindler23 linking the sonata (however ambiguously) 
with Shakespeare’s play. While the veracity of the comment has never been determined, 
the remark was publicized through Schindler’s biography of Beethoven and the 
designation “Tempest” to Beethoven’s Sonata Op. 31, No. 2 has stuck. The paratext of 
Shakespeare’s Tempest with this particular sonata provides an example of an unofficial 
paratext. While the point may be argued that this paratext became established through 
hearsay, Schindler’s affiliation with Beethoven has never been in doubt (although his 
motives may have been questionable), and the fact remains there exists no proof that 
Schindler invented this comment. The rather murky nature of the comment’s originsis 
typical of an unofficial paratext as a clearer attribution would most likely place it within 
the realm of official paratext.  
 The paratext, whether official or unofficial, thus serves more as the environment 
for interpretation than a narrative or sequential program determining interpretation. In 
light of Schopenhauer’s schema, the distinction between paratext and program takes on 
renewed significance in redeeming program music from exile. Schopenhauer, whil he 
may only have been referring to the worst kind of illustrative music (music wholly 
dependent upon an extra-musical text), nonetheless includes all extra-musical 
associations in his rejection. If the extra-musical associations are viewd as paratext 
however, the music remains intact as an a priori representation of the Will without 
sacrificing those extra-musical elements that were clearly factors in the genesis of certain 
nineteenth-century compositions. Categorizing such extra-musical material s paratext 
                                                
23 Anton Felix Schindler, Beethoven As I Knew Him, edited by Donald W. MadArdle, Translated by 
Constance S. Jolly [from Schindler’s Biographie von Ludwig van Beethoven, 1860] (Chapel Hill, NC: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1966), 406. 
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should also provide clearer points of connection between non-narrative, non-sequential 
extra-musical material and the associated musical compositions. For Liszt especially, the 
incorporation of paratext was not an attempt to buttress weak compositions with textual
illustration and meaning, but rather an attempt to employ music in transcending the poetic 
idea and communicating more directly with the listener. His finest compositions therefore 
were fully functioning pieces relying upon purely musical relationships that nonetheless 
retained a paratext. While Liszt certainly accepted Schopenhauer’s claim that music was 
the greatest of all the arts, he refused to divest his music from paratextual associations. 
 
Purpose and Procedure of Study 
 
 
 The purpose of this paper is twofold: (1) To provide a philosophical and aesthetic 
foundation for constructing interpretations that include paratextual elements; (2) To 
determine connections of form, thematic design, and thematic character between 
Goethe’s Faust and Liszt’s Sonata in B minor. Based on these observations, conclusions 
will be drawn regarding paratextual meaning and musical interpretation.  
 Part I, having briefly discussed existential problems of program music in Chapter 
1 and value in Chapter 2, will conclude with the Literature Review in Chapter 3 of major 
scholarly analyses to provide some context for the subsequent analysis in this study.  
 Part II will consist of a philosophical and aesthetic discussion of the limitations of 
truth and meaning as regards musical interpretation. Chapter 4 will consist of an 
introduction of the question “is there artistic truth?” and will follow with a discus ion of 
Pragmatist perceptions of truth. Chapter 5 will compare the different viewpoints of truth 
one gains from both performance and analysis. Chapter 6 will discuss philosophical and 
16 
 
aesthetic assignments of meaning to truth. Chapter 7 will apply concepts of 
phenomenological intelligibility to both the analytical process and extra-musical 
programs. Chapter 8 will then conclude with limitations on truth, meaning, and aesthetic 
response. 
 Having arrived at an understanding of the limits of the score and the 
responsibilities of the interpreter, Part III will proceed to analyze Liszt’s Sonata in B 
minor through the application of the paratext Faust to major thematic areas and formal 










No other work of Liszt has attracted anything like the  
amount of scholarly attention devoted to his Sonata in B  
Minor. Everybody appears to think that he is entitled to hold  
an opinion about it. And since many of those opinions are  
mutually exclusive, the literature has become a minefield  
through which both player and teacher proceed at their peril.24 
 
The controversy surrounding the many descriptions, analyses, and interpretations 
of Liszt’s Sonata in B minor is at least as old as the controversy surrounding the work 
itself. Although it was dedicated to Robert Schumann (perhaps in gratitude over 
Schumann’s dedication of his Fantasy to Liszt), the Schumanns were never enthusiastic 
about the piece. Clara went so far as to write of the sonata, “merely a blind noise –  
healthy ideas anymore, everything confused, one cannot find one clear harmonic 
progression – and yet I must now thank him for it. It is really too awful.”25  
While subsequent discussions of the piece have balanced Schumann’s criticism 
with enthusiastic accolades, polemical tendencies remain a part of many an lyses. 
Generally analysis takes one of three shapes: a strict bar-by-bar musical analysis; a 
performance-based interpretation (often including some vague programmatic descriptors); 
or a strict programmatic interpretation.  
Rey Longyear, in his book Nineteenth-Century Romanticism in Music, offers a 
measure-by-measure chart of the sonata including musical examples of five major 
                                                
24 Alan Walker, Reflections on Liszt (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 128. 




thematic and motivic elements.26 The chart includes descriptions of the “double form”27 
of the sonata and discusses how the formal structure maintains cohesion over the course 
of the work. No mention is made of any programmatic associations within the work 
either by scholars or those within Liszt’s circle. Longyear provides a purely musical 
analysis, albeit one prefaced by his opinion that the sonata is “the most influential piano 
composition for the second half of the nineteenth century.”28 
In his book The Sonata Since Beethoven, William Newman offers an extensive 
discussion of Liszt’s formal procedure as well as a chart mapping the piece’s double form 
in detail, both as a single-movement sonata form and a four-movement cycle. He notes,  
curiously enough in view of its wide renown – writers seem  
generally to have preferred to discuss the Sonata in b only  
briefly, sketchily, or subjectively, rather than attempt to pin  
down the specific divisions that define the double function.29 
 
In addition to a formal map, Newman discusses principal tonal, tempo, and 
metrical changes. His opinion of the sonata’s five major thematic elements ar  also 
included as part of his chart.30 A comparison with Liszt’s Dante Sonata is mentioned but 
not dealt with in any detail. No other discussion is made regarding other scholars’ 
analyses, but Newman does list a number of other works by contemporaries and students 
that share similar formal traits and may have been influences on or influenced by Liszt’s 
work.  
 
                                                
26 See Appendix I, Example 1. 
27 “Double-Form,” or “double-function” have been the terms used for the idea that Liszt’s Sonata in B 
minor exists simultaneously as a single-movement sonata form, and as an unbroken three or four-
movement cycle.  
28 Rey M. Longyear, Nineteenth-Century Romanticism in Music, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1969), 162.  
29 William S. Newman, The Sonata Since Beethoven, A History of the Sonata Idea (Chapel Hill, NC: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1969), 373.  
30 See Appendix I, Example 2.   
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Ben Arnold, in his article “Piano Music: 1835-1861” found in The Liszt 
Companion, provides a chart comparing scholars Newman, Longyear, Winklhofer, Searle, 
Walker, Watson, and Hamilton’s formal measure-by-measure analyses of the sonata 
covering the years 1969-96. 31 He discusses at some length the problems inherent in 
describing such a large-scale form in such detail and then provides his own formal 
measure-by-measure chart,32 including musical examples of what he considers the five 
major thematic elements. While Longyear did not discuss even the existence of 
programmatic elements, in this regard, Arnold is far from mute. He states, “Liszt presents 
his Sonata without any program or extra-musical thought whatsoever. Its dramatic nd 
evocative nature has led numerous writers, nonetheless, to insist on creating their own 
programs for the work.”33 While Arnold may perhaps be convinced of the work’s 
absolute purity, he nevertheless gives an extremely useful account of different scholars’ 
programmatic scenarios, as well as a list of performers who thought of the sonata in 
Faustian terms.34  
Sharon Winklhofer’s book Liszt’s Sonata in B Minor: A Study of Autograph 
Sources and Documents actually deals with much more than manuscript studies. Part I 
deals with Liszt’s life in Weimar and the conception, publication, and early performance 
of the sonata; Part II provides a study of autograph sources and manuscripts; Part III 
deals specifically with the autograph of the Sonata; and Part IV discusse the 
compositional process, analytical approach, and formal characteristics. While inklhofer 
                                                
31 See Appendix I, Example 3. 
32 See Appendix I, Example 4. 
33 Ben Arnold, “Piano Music: 1835-1861,” The Liszt Companion, ed. Ben Arnold (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 2002), 119. 
34 The discussion of Bertrand Ott’s article and my subsequent analysis of the sonata will provide more 
details regarding the parallels between Faust and Liszt’s Sonata in B minor. 
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offers no discussion of programmatic approaches, she insists on a slightly different 
approach to charting the sonata from Longyear and Newman. 
 A new interpretation of the Sonata depends upon  
recognition of the following general characteristics. The  
Sonata was conceived as a one-movement sonata form, and  
not as an instrumental cycle of several movements strung  
together. Many related compositional problems were solved  
in the symphonic poems and other instrumental works in  
one-movement sonata form, all of which were drafted  
before the Sonata. Liszt’s Sonata was in fact the logical  
culmination of his other structural experiments, and not the  
reverse. There is no evidence to support the view that Liszt  
ever attempted to superimpose multiple movements over a  
large sonata form.35 
 
Generally, formal analyses at least mention the superimposition of a cyclical form on 
Liszt’s one-movement design. This superimposition serves a dual function: it legitimizes 
the sonata designation with a traditional three- or four-movement design, and emphasizes 
cyclical elements providing cohesion to the work as a whole. Because this sonata fl ws 
similarly to more cyclical forms, the breaking up of the work into clearly defined units 
can be nearly irresistible. Winklhofer rejects this tamer conception of a multi- ovement 
work, and instead posits that Liszt’s Sonata in B minor epresents the culminating 
triumph of his formal experiments in both orchestral and piano works. The one-
movement sonata form meant that Liszt managed to completely subsume the prevalnt 
cyclical forms of the day within the sonata principle: simultaneously achieving the 
paradoxical goals of creating a sonata steeped in traditional legitimacy that revolutionized 
the very conception of sonata design. Winklhofer offers perhaps the most extensive 
charts of anyone describing the formal details of the sonata offering a themtic chart, 
table of symbols, analytical formal chart, a chart describing structural proportions, and a 
                                                
35 Sharon Winklhofer, Liszt’s Sonata in B Minor: A Study of Autograph Sources and Documents, (Ann 
Arbor, MI: UMI Research Press, 1980), 127. 
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chart describing tonal design. 36 
Kenneth Hamilton, in the Cambridge Handbook Liszt: Sonata in B Minor offers a 
comparative chart (although somewhat less exhaustive than Arnold) of the analyses by 
scholars Newman, Longyear, and Winklhofer.37 Hamilton then points out the controversy 
existing among these scholars regarding the large-scale division of the single-movement 
form into three or four “movements” corresponding with different sections.  
Both Newman and Longyear agree that the Sonata can be  
considered either as a single movement in sonata form or as  
a multi-movement unit, with a slow movement and a  
scherzo. They differ over whether the sections fall into four  
movements (Newman) or three (Longyear). Winklhofer  
remains aloof from this bone of contention, for she sees the  
Sonata only as one single movement, and rejects the  
double-function view as false. She admits that there is a  
‘slow sub-movement’ in the centre, but refuses to identify  
the fugue with a scherzo.38 
 
While Hamilton finds this difference of opinion “negligible,” the discrepancy clearly 
demonstrates the hazards in describing the sonata’s single-movement form in the context 
of a multi-movement “double-form.” Hamilton carefully points out that all three scholars 
are in agreement “that the Sonata is not a programmatic work, and that as a result 
analysis of it can only proceed on purely musical terms.”39  He then discusses the sonata 
extensively, describing formal, thematic, and motivic elements in the context of historical 
and contemporaneous precedents, with other scholars’ analyses and interpretations. The 
musical analysis represents just one section of the book, with programmatic elements 
being discussed in other sections. Hamilton offers no measure-by-measure chart but 
                                                
36 See Appendix I, Example 5. 
37 See Appendix I, Example 6. 
38 Kenneth Hamilton, “Liszt: Sonata in B minor,” Cambridge Music Handbooks, general editor Julian 
Rushton (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 32-33. 
39 Ibid., 28. 
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rather weaves his formal analysis into his larger musical discussion. As the book is meant 
to be a more-or-less complete guide to the piece, other sections include: orchestral sonata 
forms, programmatic interpretations, manuscript and printed text discussions, 
performance practice, and compositional legacy.  
 While these examples represent purely theoretical discussions, other scholas 
discuss interpretation based on performance practice. Alan Walker’s Reflections on Liszt 
provides precisely this type of analysis. Typical of such analyses, formal discussion of 
the piece is interspersed with suggestions and comments to the pianist regarding 
performance details (like fingering), commentary on aesthetic taste and trends, and 
admonitions to play the piece artfully rather than for the sake of cheap applause. For 
example, in discussing the final octave passage in the coda, Walker states “it is the 
thematic integrity of the passage, not the vanity of the player, that calls for expression. 
Liszt’s sounding sense must not be turned into senseless sound.”40  
 Charles Rosen, in his book The Romantic Generation, also provides an analysis 
dedicated to a performance interpretation. First establishing the sonata in the tradition of 
Beethoven and Schubert, Rosen allows a certain narrative design to the sonata but 
remains wary of any attachment of programmatic ideas. 
  The Sonata in B Minor is not program music, but by its  
manipulation of clearly defined early nineteenth-century  
genres, it constructs something like a narrative (the fluid  
relations among the themes display their effectiveness  
here). The mysterious and sinister opening and the satanic  
statement of the main theme quoted above lead, after a  
powerful stretto, to the hero as Lucifer; the satanic theme  
then turns into a brilliant demonstration of virtuosity.41 
 
 
                                                
40 Alan Walker, Reflections on Liszt, 140. 
41 Charles Rosen, The Romantic Generation, 486. 
23 
 
While Rosen certainly uses extra-musical content to describe and advise the pianist on 
the “character” of particular themes, he remains extraordinarily reluctant to discuss the 
details of his narrative. He employs thematic discussion to compare the sonata to others 
of Liszt, Schumann, and Beethoven in his bid to establish the sonata within the hierarchy 
of great nineteenth-century works.   
 Rosen’s awkwardness when offering programmatic models (he writes, “A literal 
and naïve interpretation is inescapable,”)42 is hardly unique. Programmatic discussions 
are often rife with embarrassment about including “corruptive fantasy” in a serious 
musical discussion. Hamilton, beginning his discussion of scholarly musical analysis with 
“When we return from this land of programmatic make-believe…,”43 demonstrates yet 
another example of programmatic disdain. Nevertheless, performers and scholars do exist 
who have seriously ascribed (with varying degrees of success) different programs to the 
sonata. 
In his article “The B Minor Sonata Revisited: Deciphering Liszt,” David Brown 
mentions the connection between opening material of the Sonata and the Faust symphony.  
The second of the two descending scales with which the  
Sonata opens had not only been based on one of the ciphers  
to be used the following year in the Faust symphony, but had  
also exemplified the same process of linkage and  
overlapping to generate melodic growth.44  
 
Brown however contends that the sonata is autobiographical, its themes being ciphers of 
both Liszt’s and Carolyne von Sayn-Wittgenstein’s names.  
                                                
42 Charles Rosen, The Romantic Generation,  491. 
43 Hamilton, “Liszt: Sonata in B minor,” 31. 
44 David Brown, “The B Minor Sonata Revisited: Deciphering Liszt,” The Musical Times, Vol. 144, No. 
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Karolina von Sayn-Wittgenstein Cipher46 
Example 3-1: Liszt-Wittgenstein Cipher 
 Brown contends that the musical material of the sonata and the interaction 
between major themes draws from the private relationship between Liszt and 
Wittgenstein. He offers a parallel view of thematic content; describing parallel love 
themes based on each cipher. In this way, Brown applies a biographical program t the 
four major thematic areas present in the sonata.  
Tibor Szász, in his article “Liszt’s symbols for the Divine and Diabolical: Their 
Revelation of a Program in the B Minor Sonata,” describes how musical elements in 
Liszt’s sonata must be heard as programmatic. While he links the program to Milton’s 
Paradise Lost, the symbols are conventionally Christian and his musical proofs are drawn 
from Liszt’s specifically sacred music.  
Szász begins his study by drawing a parallel between the crucifixion musicof 
Liszt’s Via Crucis and mm. 297-310 of the sonata.  
  
                                                





Musically the two passages could hardly be more alike.  
Their chords are identical in tonality, harmony, register,  
dominant pedal, dynamics, and are followed by recitatives  
that begin alike….In Via crucis, the chordal blows  
symbolize the nailing of Jesus to the Cross, and the  
recitative sets Christ’s words from the Cross, “My God, my  
God, why has thou forsaken me?” The Sonata’s chords and  
recitative had become two separate Stations of the Cross.47 
Szász then identifies the Grandioso theme from the sonata (mm 105-8) as “The Cross 
Symbol”48 and ties the three-note motive made up of a major second and minor third with 
Liszt’s “Cross” theme from his oratorio St. Eliszabeth. He notes that Winklhofer found 
this three-note theme in seven additional works and describes it as a common recurrenc  
in Liszt’s compositions. However, he also notes that “When the Grandioso’s melodic 
contour reappears in the other works, it is always with a Christian connotation.”49 
Dolores Pesce, in her article “Expressive resonance in Liszt’s piano music,” al o 
identifies the Grandioso theme with the St. Eliszabeth oratorio. 51 
 In contrast to the Christ theme, Szász identifies the falling seventh interval in the 
first theme with Lucifer. 
The falling seventh interval, characteristic of the Lucifer  
motif in the Sonata, is immediately featured in Bells of the  
Strassburg Cathedral. The Luciferic spirits are identified by  
Lucifer’s opening sentence in which the word “spirits” is set  
to a descending interval that has the identical pitch span as  
the falling diminished seventh of the Sonata’s Lucifer motif.52 
 
 
                                                
47 Tibor Szász, “Liszt’s Symbols for the Divine and Diabolical: Their Revelation of a Program in the B 
Minor Sonata,” Journal of the American Liszt Society, vol. 15 (1984): 39. 
48 Ibid., 43. 
49 Ibid.. 
51 Dolores Pesce, “Expressive Resonance in Liszt’s Piano Music.” 19th Century Piano Music, 2nd ed. edited 
by R. Larry Todd (New York, NY:Routledge, 2004), 384.  
52 Tibor Szász, Liszt’s Symbols for the Divine and Diabolical: Their Revelation of a Program in the B 
Minor Sonata, 50.  
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Szász also identifies the falling seventh interval with Adam’s fall from grace, 
offering a parallel program for the same material (which proves rather confusing). The 
repeated notes in the primary theme are identified with Lucifer. 
While the falling sevenths of the Lucifer motif symbolize 
the fall itself from above to below, the evenly spaced,  
sharply marked chain of repeated notes symbolize the  
already fallen devil known as Satan, or to use his medieval  
personification, Mephistopheles. Liszt’s symbolic use of the  
repeated notes in the Sonata can be deduced because in  
other works they are consistently used as a symbol for the  
satanic.53  
 
Szász cites examples of other satanic repeated notes: the “Mephistopheles” mov ment of 
the Faust symphony, and Mephisto Waltz Nos. 1-3. The article concludes with a 
description of mm. 120-254 as the physical love between Adam and Eve, and mm. 255-
276 as “the eruption of violence between Cain and Abel.”54  
Szász does identify some useful motivic parallels between musical elements of 
the sonata and musical elements in other definitively programmatic works. However, the 
general lack of any musical examples, his broad assumption of the reader’s sympath  for 
his ideas, and his attempt to simultaneously assign two programmatic realities (Paradise 
Lost, and Genesis 3:1-4:11) to the sonata generate a fair amount of confusion. While one 
might draw parallels between Adam and Christ, Cain and Lucifer, simultaneously d ing 
so only compounds the difficulty of creating compelling links to extra-musical content. 
The programmatic waters are murky enough. However, his most useful points – (1) that 
certain motivic elements in the sonata find clear programmatic des ription in other works, 
and (2) that these programmatic associations may be fairly used in determining eaning 
                                                
53 Tibor Szász, Liszt’s Symbols for the Divine and Diabolical: Their Revelation of a Program in the B 
Minor Sonata, 50. 
54 Ibid., 54. 
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within the sonata – are both well taken and prove useful to any serious attempt to 
determine paratextual meaning.  
Probably the most influential and enduring program associated with Liszt’s B 
minor sonata is the Faust model handed down by a number of his students. While not 
incompatible with the Szász program, there are enough differences to make each one 
distinct. Bertrand Ott, in his article An Interpretation of Liszt’s Sonata in B Minor, 
suggests that the Sonata forms a symphonic poem. He is careful, however, to note that 
unlike the Faust-Symphony, the Sonata does not describe  
the characters by episodes – Faust, Marguerite [Gretchen],  
and Mephisto.  It weaves them into an intricate web which  
closely follows the events of Goethe’s play, without  
indulging in childish transliteration.55  
 
Ott conceives of the sonata as representative of a grand struggle between Mephistopheles 
and Faust, assigning the opening Allegro Energico theme to Mephistopheles and 
ascribing the Grandioso Theme to Faust as representative of his “youth, pride, and 
sensuality.”56  
 In contrast to most analyses that delineate four or five themes across the sonata,
Ott rather perceives all musical material as specifically derived from these two thematic 
forces. While none would argue that the thematic material in the sonata is actually four 
different musical ideas (as all bear a resemblance to the opening thematic material), Ott 
stands on thin ice by claiming that other major thematic events are merely variations.  
Although Ott begins his analysis with a protestation that the program cannot 
“indulge in childish transliteration,”57 his subsequent linkage between Faust and musical 
                                                
55 Bertrand Ott, “An Interpretation of Liszt’s Sonata in B Minor,” Journal of The American Liszt Society 10 
(1981), 30. 
56 Ibid., 33. 
57 Ibid., 30. 
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events takes the following forms: 
Meas. 32-54: Mephisto’s physical and psychic  
development; vv. 1238-1321 in G.’s F. 
Meas. 255-96:  Accelerated ride expressed with  
meanness, and built upon the theme of Faust’s desire and  
passion; Mephisto is mocking; vv. 1851-67 in G.’s F.58
 
While Ott indeed stays clear of strict episodic narrative, he seems to create instead a 
narrative sequence based on a sentimental reading of the text. Rather than link events or 
characters, he attempts to connect characteristic moods with the musical score. This 
interpretation makes dual demands on the reader as it requires that the reader not only 
agree with Ott’s interpretation of the score, but also Ott’s interpretation of the play. The 
precarious task of describing extra-musical parallels without a program is made even 
more so by Ott’s use of a highly individual interpretation of Faust as his paratext. In spite 
of his best intentions, Ott does appear to be “transliterating” his interpretation of 
Mephisto’s and Faust’s moods to the score. 
While Ott’s analysis may run to the melodramatic, it remains as fair a 
programmatic description as any other, the more fantastical elements are simply 
indicative of the inherent programmatic problem. Without an explicit program to follow, 
one may simply pull fistfuls of lines from the play and ascribe them to musical events. 
The question of Liszt’s intentions, his students’ contentions, and subsequent 
interpretations becomes moot as none can address specific instances specifically 
described by Liszt as retaining specific meaning. While Claudio Arrau claimed the Faust 
scenario was “taken for granted among Liszt pupils,”59 the question of which components 
of the scenario and how the scenario was linked to the interpretation remain contentious 
                                                
58 Bertrand Ott, “An Interpretation of Liszt’s Sonata in B Minor,” 35. 




issues. Too broad an interpretation of the Faust legend and relevance becomes difficult to 
establish. Too detailed and one quickly becomes reduced to fanciful text-painting.  
 Each analysis of Liszt’s Sonata in B minor falls along a spectrum. Some scholars 
deal only with the score, others range farther afield. The conservative end of the spectrum 
provides a measure of safety and legitimacy (but perhaps less help to the performer). The 
liberal end of the spectrum provides nearly unlimited potential for imagination (but 
almost no rigorous connections to the score).   If Liszt’s Sonata in B minor was indeed 
inspired by Faust, that inspiration should be evident in thematic events and 
relationships – the foreground. However, the fact that Liszt never went on record as 
having assigned Faust as a specific program to the sonata also indicates that the 
inspiration may function on a background level – affecting formal and interpretive 
decisions but without declaring manifest authority over the music.  
 Establishing a paratext and connecting those elements to the score lies decidedly 
toward the more liberal end of the analytical spectrum and therefore becomes more 
vulnerable to an interpreter’s mere fancy. Because any paratext associated with Liszt’s 
Sonata in B minor must be an unofficial paratext, the discussion must be rigorously 
grounded in something more firm than opinion. By first setting philosophical and 
aesthetic boundaries, one may subsequently move more securely into discussing 

























The performer attempting to interpret a given score must first admit the exist nce 
of certain problems confronting him in regard to interpretive decisions. First the 
performer must assign performance values to certain notational variables including 
dynamics, tempo, rhythm, and pacing. While these variables are almost alwaysindicated 
by the composer, specific values (outside of computer programs) are almost never 
assigned. Second, the performer must in some way describe the musical relationships in 
the score in terms of aesthetic variables. If music were simply notes on thepage, then 
determining the value of an interpretation would simply be a matter of accuracy. Third, 
the performer must prescribe meaningful values to the aesthetic variables. Historically, 
music has always been seen as engaging listeners’ emotions on some level forbetter or 
worse. Allowing that composers intended their music to engage listeners more viscerally 
than only at the level of pure intellectual contemplation, aesthetic meaning must be at 
least broadly determined by the performer. 
Because the performer is responsible for assigning a great deal of subjective 
meaning in his interpretation, and because the interpretation necessarily must be tr thful 
in its rendering of the score, the performer will assign interpretive values based on his 
own analysis and technical training that are consistent with his individual experience. If 
no score existed, then any interpretation could be seen as meaningful and truthful as i 
would accurately reflect the performer’s experience. The interpretation, however, must be 
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representative of the score. The fundamental dilemma may be posed thus: how can the 
performer know whether his interpretation is truthful and meaningful in regard to the 
score, or truthful and meaningful only within his own experience?  
This question, difficult enough to answer in regard to absolute music, becomes 
even more problematic when applied to program music. Pieces that include programs, 
either explicitly or implicitly linked to the score, prove especially resistant to analysis as 
they involve interpreting meaning beyond purely musical relationships. Traditional 
interpretive models have either disregarded the programmatic elements (in favor of a 
simple model involving only indisputable musical relationships), or have described the 
musical relationships in terms of the program (in favor of a simple model involving 
obvious or explicit aesthetic relationships). In only allowing one or the other, traditional 
interpretive models have failed to offer a truthful rendering of the score as in e ch case 
meaningful notational and aesthetic variables have been discarded in favor of a more 
streamlined approach. One redeems these variables, however, at his own peril as the 





Is There Artistic Truth? 
 
Kingsley Price, in his article “Is There Artistic Truth?” sets up certain boundaries 
for the question:  
 Some have contended that all works of art are true or false  
in the correspondence sense; and others, rejecting this view,  
have contended or suggested that all works of art are true or  
false in the sense that they do or do not afford insight into  
reality. If the first view is correct, it is easy to hold that truth  
in the correspondence sense is a criterion for aesthetic  
excellence; if the second, that the conveyance of insight acts  
as such a criterion.….If all works of art were true or false,  
each would be meaningful, i.e., would contain propositions  
or be constituted by them. This is to say that each work  
would refer to something other than itself in such a way that  
if that other thing existed, the work would correspond to it.  
But not every work of art can contain propositions or be  
constituted by them. Consequently not all works of art are  
true or false.60 
 
The question of artistic truth seems especially important in discussing music and 
specifically the interpretation of music. The judging of an interpretation as good or bad, 
correct or incorrect, is a responsibility musicians accept every day. Often the discussion 
takes the form of “religious” warfare where truth and meaning are malleable quantities to 
further one’s own ideology. However, what is really meant by artistic truth? When 
musicians speak of music being “meaningful,” to what are they referring? One might try 
to define musical truth as a correspondence with some extra-musical truth (or ideal 
quantity), but it becomes difficult to definitively state precisely how the music translates 
in a corresponding way the original truth’s meaning. Conversely, if one denies any 
correspondence of extra-musical truth and instead maintains that either the score or some 
accepted performance practice embodies an idealized absolute truth, one also finds 
                                                




persistent problems in both the ability to fully perceive that truth and then apply it 
musically in any meaningful way.  
Aesthetically, does a widely held opinion labeling a work of art as “true” or “false” 
determine its value? If program music is considered “false” music, is it stll valuable? 
Often in discussing canonical masterworks the words “true” and “valuable” re used 
interchangeably. However, equating truth and value involves a number of profound 
problems: How does the performer determine what is true? How far must one agree with 
canonical truth (for example performance practice) in order to form a “true” 
interpretation? How much freedom does the performer have in interpreting notatio ? 
How does the performer approach music previously determined to be “false” music? 
In analyzing and performing music, one must either wrestle with some 
exceedingly thorny issues, or else assign values to performance and analysis so narrow 
that any potential hazards involving truth and meaning remain excluded from the 
discussion. Both the analytical process and the performance process maintain extensiv  
traditions, practices, techniques, and lineages. All analytical traditions and performance 
practice traditions claim to (at least partially) describe artistic truth. Regarding 
interpretation, however, how can one distinguish what is true from that which one prefers 
over the alternative? If interpretive analysis remains the description of musical 
relationships for the purpose of performance, how does one distinguish between manifest 
musical relationships and possible musical relationships? Specifically, can extra-musical 
programs, characters, and formal models legitimately be ascribed to musical relationships 
when no reliable, extant source unequivocally identifies those as conditional influences? 
Indeed, music has always been more than notes on a page. Musical truth and meaning can 
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only be realized when the complex relationships of performance, analysis, and 
compositional genesis are fully explored. As Pragmatist discussions of problems relating 
to absolute truth offer striking parallels to discussions of problems regarding musical 
truth, a basic understanding of Pragmatist principles should provide a starting point. 
While Pragmatist principles are not relevant to Liszt in a historical sense (he most 
certainly did not have them in mind when composing), the Pragmatist models can provide 
the twenty-first century musician with a basic philosophical reasoning for incrporating 
paratexts into a work’s interpretation. 
 
Truth: A Pragmatist Rendering 
 
In A Companion Guide to Pragmatism, Margolis mentions a discussion between 
Rorty and Putnam during the second phase of 20th century Pragmatism. This discussion 
regarded  
the propriety of reading Dewey along the lines of Rorty’s  
so-called ‘postmodernist’ account of pragmatism and of  
Putnam’s counter-effort to reject such innovations in  
favor of a more canonical picture of realism – cast in  
metaphysical and epistemological terms strong enough to  
escape the charge of relativism.61  
 
Margolis then posits that  
 
Rorty’s intention was to retire metaphysics and  
epistemology altogether, on the plea that such would-be  
disciplines, essential to canonical philosophy, were actually  
sham undertakings: there is, and could be he claimed,  
speaking as a pragmatist, no science of knowledge as such;  
hence no way to demonstrate that (say) realism was true.62  
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Tellingly, neither side of Pragmatists ever convinced the other. However, the questions 
raised have an immediate bearing on both the nature of truth and methods of approaching 
truth.  
Rorty’s concern – that relying on metaphysics and epistemology to describe truth 
requires an acceptance of the premise that these disciplines are in fact true – seems valid. 
Describing truth in terms of canonically accepted a priori ideas is similar to children 
describing “rules” governing reality in imaginary games – neither description needs to 
retain any real truth in order to appear functionally valid to the participants. Putnam’s 
position, however, that discarding such traditional reference points amounts to 
intellectual vertigo, is also well taken. Thus, in defining truth, one must recognize the 
necessity of framing any discussion within historical precedents, while at th  same time 
recognizing that appealing to historical precedent relies heavily upon canonical 
inviolability for credibility rather than any demonstrably intrinsic truth. As such, 
definitions of truth either deny the possibility of any canonically accepted a priori ideas 
as necessarily being true (thus inducing intellectual vertigo by eliminating historical 
points of reference), or rely on arguments built substantially on the relative quicksand of 
historical precedent.  
Peirce, generally regarded as the first Pragmatist, followed Kant’s model in 
insisting that “the limits of experience define the limits of knowledge.”63 He also 
“conceived experience in such a way as to be capable of aiding us in discovering to some
degree the way things are (not simply the way they appear to us).”64 Peirce thus 
                                                
63 Vincent M. Colapietro, “Charles Sanders Peirce,” in A Companion Guide To Pragmatism, eds. John R. 
Shook and Joseph Margolis (Malden, Massachussetts: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 16. 
64 Ibid., 16. 
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determined Kant’s idea of the Ding an sich,65 the thing-in-itself, as being impossible. 
Colapietro writes, 
Whereas Kant maintained that things in themselves are  
conceivable but unknowable (since we are able to think  
them without contradiction but not able to know them by  
recourse to any experience), Peirce argued they were  
incognizable, meaning that they are not even conceivable.66  
While admitting to a cosmos larger than our experience, Peirce maintained,  
Over against any cognition, there is an unknown but knowable  
reality; but over against all possible cognition, there is only the  
self-contradictory…Nothing can be more completely false than  
that we can experience only our own ideas.”67  
Herein Pierce describes an additional difficulty in ascertaining truth: if knowledge is 
limited to experience, then one’s attained knowledge of truth can only be evaluated 
through one’s own experience. If truth maintains an infinite existence independent of 
phenomenal perception, then even if one can know certain parts of truth through 
experience, one can never completely comprehend the entire truth as one cannot ever 
experience an infinite noumenal truth. Without phenomenally experiencing an infinite 
truth, one cannot comprehensively evaluate his own knowledge of truth.  
Of course, if the discovery of the way things are (not simply as they appear to be) 
is limited by one’s experience, one cannot determine whether his understanding of the 
truth is simply a flawed (or lacking) experience confusing the appearance of truth with 
actual truth. Because reality (experience) does not necessarily equal truth, one may gain 
knowledge through his experience without necessarily gaining a greater understa ing of 
truth. While Peirce did think that given an infinite number of resources an infinite truth 
                                                
65 Kant’s description of a noumenal world independent from man’s perception of the world (phenomenal). 




could be discovered, the inherent danger of using the (realistic) limits of experience to 
determine truth still applies.  
 The problem may be summed up thus: because one’s understanding of truth is 
defined through experience, and because truth exists outside of one’s experience, there 
always remains the danger that one’s understanding of the truth remains subject to one’s 
experience. Any phenomenal understanding of noumenal truth will forever remain in 
question as one can never determine whether or not the objective truth actually connects 
with the subjective experience. 
 The work of pragmatists in trying to explain the concept of truth contains certain 
parallels to musicians explaining and evaluating nineteenth century music. While works 
of the Classical period – most notably of the Viennese school – usually serve as supreme 
examples of form determining interpretation (truth and meaning determined through 
purely musical relationships), some view the music of the early and mid-nineteenth 
century as bogged down in interpretive relativism, myopic formal structures, and 
virtuosic egotism. The formal clarity, dramatic large-scale uses of dissonance, and 
contextually appropriate virtuosity of Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven had run its course 
and left early nineteenth-century composers with no clear wellspring from which to draw 
their inspiration. Without a clear hierarchy of traditional musical relationships in the 
score upon which to defend the “truthfulness” of interpretations (or even of the work 
itself), and with the additional baggage of a decidedly subjective and individualistic 
performance tradition, twentieth-century performers were left with a similar dilemma to 
twentieth century Pragmatists: either to try to cast their interpretation in strong enough 
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epistemological68 and metaphysical terms to escape the charge of interpretive relativism, 
or to follow Schenker’s practice of relegating such music to the trash heap as sham 
constructions. 
In trying to determine truth within musical interpretation, one must first clarify 
the boundaries between truth and meaning within music. Through drawing parallels 
between (a) the pragmatic “experience” and musical performance (eith r actively 
performing or actively listening), and (b) pragmatic “knowledge” and analysis of the 
musical score, both the usefulness and inherent obstacles represented by both 
performance and analysis may be better defined. Once these limitations are i  place, the 
pitfalls in determining truth can be defined, and meaning better described. 
                                                







Truth and Experience: Music in Performance 
 
The Pragmatist discussion divided truth into noumenal (an unknowable, infinite 
quantity) and phenomenal (that truth which may be experienced as a knowable finite 
quantity) categories. In applying these principles to music, similar categories can prove 
extremely useful. Eduard Hanslick conceived of a “division of music into composition 
and reproduction.”69 Music may thus be divided into two categorical realities: the score 
(abstracted music or potential music), and the performance (actualized music or kinetic 
music).  Hanslick notes that the division “makes itself felt preeminently in the 
investigation of the subjective impression of music.”70 This subjective impression of 
music refers primarily to the phenomenal experience of music – the interpretation. 
Hanslick writes,  
To the performer it is granted to release directly the feeling  
which possesses him, through his instrument, and breathe 
 into his performance the wild storms, the passionate fervour  
[sic], the serene power and joy of his inwardness.71  
The performer’s direct experience of the musical score releases the musical score from 
objective abstraction to subjective actuality.72 The score’s objective truth lies in its 
potentiality. A musical score remains free from any subjective experienc  as no 
interpretive decisions need be made for the score to exist. Just as certainly, however, the 
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72 Performance here is meant to describe the aural phenomenal experience. While the musical score may 
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potential music contained in the score cannot come into being without the performer 
making subjective decisions in regard to interpretation. The composer therefore in 
notating a score is not crafting an interpretation, but rather crafting a piece of music as an 
objective abstraction. While the composer may attempt to notate interpretive features, 
their very notation ensures their inclusion as an abstract quantity of the score and 
therefore subject to interpretation. If both knowledge and meaning are defined by an
through experience, then the subjective experience of a musical performance acts as the 
defining quality determining both the performer’s “knowledge” of the score and the 
meaning therefore assigned to the score – the “reproduction” of the work defining the 
“composition.” So, the performance of a score offers the phenomenal experience so 
necessary to the Pragmatist’s conception of truth.  
 Performance, however, lies fraught with danger when used to determine musical 
truth. The Pragmatists’ difficulty in determining philosophical truth (i.e. how to 
determine one’s arrival at truth rather than just the appearance of truth) likewise finds a 
parallel in the performer relying on his experience to determine musical truth.  
Hanslick writes,  
Of course the performer can deliver only what is already in  
the composition… In the instant of re-creation, however,  
this very assimilation, is the work of his, the performer’s,  
spirit. The same piece disturbs or delights, according to how  
it is animated into resounding actuality, just as one and the  
same person is at one time seen as full of rapture, and at  
another time, dull and despondent.73 
 
The primary obstacle to using performance as a determinant of truth lies in the subjective 
quality of the performer’s application of phenomenal experience to the score. In 
performance, the objective musical score and subjective interpretation becme one.  
                                                
73 Eduard Hanslick, On The Musically Beautiful, 49. 
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In his book on Schnabel’s interpretation, Karl Wolff writes,  
  He [the performer] will only be able to perform his task if he  
makes music quite spontaneously, or as Heine says, if the  
presentation ‘reveals the performer standing on the same free  
spiritual heights as the composer, if it convinces us that he too  
is free.’74  
A strong performance of a weak composition may ennoble the composition in the minds 
of the listener. The weak performance likewise degrades the listener’s opinion of the 
composition. Additionally, the same performer (given different performances) may 
convey different or even contradictory interpretations of the same material; the same 
piece disturbing or delighting “according to how it is animated into resounding 
actuality.”75 If experience determines truth, then multiple interpretations of a piece may 
each be musically true (according to the performers’ phenomenal experience of the score) 
while at the same time exhibiting different features. If the only point of reference 
regarding the truth of an interpretation is the performer’s phenomenal experience, then 
any decision based on his experience must be seen as musically true. The problem thus 
becomes one of perspective. While an interpretation may perhaps be true within the 
context of an individual’s experience, that interpretation must adhere to the higher 
standard of remaining true within the context of both subjective historical models of 
interpretation and the objective score. 
 The position PERFORMANCE = MUSICAL TRUTH demonstrates the subjective 
extreme possible when negating any point of reference. One performer’s interpretation 
may be regarded as charlatan by a critic or teacher; but as it reflects the experience of that 
performer, it therefore must be judged as “true.” Every composition’s worth thus lies at 
                                                
74 Konrad Wolff, Schnabel’s Interpretation of Piano Music, 2nd ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company 
Inc., 1972), 15. 
75 Eduard Hanslick, On The Musically Beautiful, 49. 
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the mercy of the performer. As William James notoriously formulated, “Thetrue is the 
name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, good, too, for definite, 
assignable reasons.”76 One might similarly describe musical truth (in the context of 
performance) as whatsoever proves itself to be useful in eliciting a desired response from 
the listener. Such relativism, while perhaps in fashion during certain times in the 
nineteenth century, offers no stable ground upon which to discuss basic interpretive 
decisions like tempo, dynamics, phrasing, articulation, and various other subjective 
aspects of musicianship. While one may admit the validity of contradictory 
interpretations, one must subsequently appeal to a larger truth of which the interpretations 
are each merely partial reflections rather than full representations. Without being attached 
to a larger truth, interpretations become relegated to the local decisions of the performer 
and cannot be judged “true” beyond that performer’s subjective decisions. As using only 
performance or experience as a truth determinant threatens to become a relativistic 
quagmire, perhaps the addition of the more intellectually rigorous “composition” or 
“knowledge” can offer the necessary reinforcement needed to interpret the objective 
score. 
 
Truth and Knowledge: Music in Analysis 
 
 
 While experience certainly informs our perception of truth, it is not a given that 
experience necessarily represents truth. Because experience does not necessarily equal 
truth, relying entirely on experience to determine truth proves inadequate. One must 
buttress this subjective experience with something more objective in order to test whether 
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or not the experience is indeed valid. Using the score as an absolute determinant 
immediately establishes a certain immutable plumb line in determining an interpretation’s 
truthfulness. First, however, one must determine the nature of one’s own perception of 
the score. The avenue chosen to perceiving a score has implications for the score’s 
objective veracity. If a score cannot exist as an aural phenomenon without being affected 
by the exigencies of performance, then in order to retain its “absolute” quality, the score 
must exist solely as an abstraction in the mind. Hanslick writes,  
  The auditory imagination however, which is something  
  entirely different from the sense of hearing regarded as a  
  mere funnel open to the surface of appearances, enjoys in  
  conscious sensuousness the sounding shapes, the  
  self-constructing tones, and dwells in free and immediate  
  contemplation of them.77  
 
The score holds tremendous potential in purifying interpretations of both relativism and 
personal ego. Indeed, many performers go so far as to invoke the law of sola composito, 
allowing only notated elements of the printed score as truthful.78 Hanslick seems to agree.  
 The auditory imagination remains unaffected by either the listener’s emotiv  
response or the performer’s personality. Acoustical considerations are likewise banished 
from the musical experience as is the quality of instrument, performer’s technique, and 
ambient audience noise. The musician is thus freed to perfectly perceive the score and 
therefore conceive the perfect performance through his auditory imagination. In addition, 
Hanslick implies that “hearing… open to the surface of appearances”79 may misrepresent 
the musical truth of a score. Since perceiving the score via auditory imagination frees the 
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musician from both the shackles of performance realities and personal ego, the sc re or 
“knowledge” must be seen as objectively true. 
 While a score remains an abstraction, it remains objectively true.80 The 
application of that “knowledge” however poses a difficult problem. Although a score 
itself may be objectively true, one must describe the score (either through prose or one’s 
auditory imagination) through an interpretive analysis.81 Based on a composer’s notation, 
decisions are made reflecting the interpreter’s understanding of the score’s meaning. As 
long as the interpretive analysis remains abstractly stated, it may claim ties to objective 
truth as the interpretive meaning remains grounded in the objectively true score. All 
theory, however, proves vulnerable once applied to reality. If an interpretation cannot
realistically be performed, then one must consider the possibility that such an 
interpretation does not accurately reflect the composition and is therefore not wholly true. 
 Alasdaire Macintyre writes in his book Ethics and Politics that  
  Experience may really or apparently be discordant with a…  
  theory in a way that falsifies that theory, if one condition  
  is satisfied: that the reasons for redescribing and reclassifying  
  the experience, so that it no longer falsifies the theory, are  
  outweighed by the reasons for treating it as a genuine  
  counterexample to the theory.82  
 
This point – that experience may falsify a theory by imposing certain conditions 
rendering the theory realistically impossible – certainly applies to purely th oretical 
interpretive analysis. If an interpretation cannot be accurately rendered in p rformance 
                                                
80 The objective component of the score not having been affected by the subjective experience of the 
interpreter. 
81 Interpretive analysis refers to the analysis of a score with the goal of understanding it for the purpose of 
interpretation as opposed to analysis
 
(an examination of a complex form, its elements, and their relations), 
attempting only to describe the musical relationship  in the score without applying these to interpretation. 
82 Alasdaire Macintyre, Ethics and Politics: Selected Essays, vol. 2, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), 89. 
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because of certain conditions of reality, then the interpretive analysis cannot be true 
insofar as being an authentic representation of the score.  
 An example of experience falsifying theory may be found in David Lewin’s 
discussion of Amfortas’s Prayer: 
The nature and logic of Riemannian tonal space are not 
 isomorphic with the nature and logic of scale-degree space.  
The musical objects and relations that Riemann isolates and  
discusses are not simply the old objects and relations dressed  
up in new packages with new labels; they are essentially  
different objects and relations, embedded in an essentially  
different geometry. That is so even if in some contexts the two  
spaces may coexist locally without apparent conflict; in this  
way the surface of a Mobius strip would locally resemble the  
surface of a cylinder to an ant who had not fully explored the  
global logic of the space.83 
 
Lewin’s concept of an enharmonic seam allowing both Riemann tonal space and scale-
degree space to exist simultaneously proves extremely useful in his description of 
Wagner’s magical effects in Parsifal. While a highly engaging interpretation, it requires 
performers and listeners to readily distinguish between the enharmonic equivalnts  
(C-flat) and (B). Realistically, the listener cannot aurally distinguish that enharmonic 
seams define the boundaries of Riemann tonal space and scale-degree space. While 
listeners with an excellent ear might be able to hear the difference between a (C-flat) and 
(B), the ability to aurally perceive that pitch as an existential seam between two different 
geometric tonal realities necessitates one’s possessing aural capabiities more commonly 
associated with super-heroes. While Lewin’s analysis certainly can help the performer 
understand the work better, it remains extraordinarily difficult to translate this 
understanding into the listener’s experience of the work.  
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 If the listener’s experience is that of the ant on the Mobius strip, then analyses 
depending on drawing a distinction between the cylinder and Mobius strip become 
problematic. The ant’s local experience traversing the Mobius strip is essentially identical 
to the experience of traversing a cylinder. Simply understanding that the object is a 
Mobius strip or cylinder does not change (in any essentials) the ant’s local experience. As 
music exists in time, marginalizing the local experience in favor of macro-formal 
abstractions disenfranchises the listener from the reality of how the music actually sounds. 
Once an analysis determines that the actual notes in the score sound “false,” (according to 
an abstract analysis), the interpretation becomes dangerously irrelevant.84 
If the score cannot guarantee a useful applied interpretation, and performance 
offers too many relativistic hazards to be authoritative, it appears that the pure pursuit of 
truth in regard to interpretation must arrive at an impasse. While one cannot dispense 
with the truthful elements each contains, neither may lay claim to offering an unassailable 
monopoly on truth. It cannot be disputed that both the score and performance variables 
must be considered in order to form an artistically true interpretation. However, without 
assigning some larger meaning to these independent elements, no large-scale 
understanding of musical truth within interpretation may be established. Indeed it is 
precisely through understanding how meaning is assigned to both audible music and 
abstracted music that a useful paradigm can be employed to determine interprta ion.  
Truth exists outside of assigned meaning yet one must assign meaning in order to 
apply truth. Truth is an infinite quantity and therefore remains true whether meaningfully 
                                                
84 While certain chords and notes may be used ambiguously (and therefore may “sound” different from 
their spelling), the dependence upon the listener to hear these ambiguities (in real time) as enharmonic 
seams demands the separation of these ambiguities from all contextual moorings. 
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interpreted or not.85 However, erroneously assigned meanings to truthful elements can 
falsify one’s perception of the original truth. Although the musical score’s objective 
truthfulness remains intact, without assigning meaning, the objective truth of the score 
cannot be applied to the interpretation. In other words, “knowledge” must inform 
“experience” through the interface of meaning.  
  
                                                








Meaning: Propositional assignment 
 
 
 If the score is considered true (as it must be for the purposes of analysis), and 
experience is considered true insofar as it allows one to know the score, there remains the 
problem of assigning meaning to that truth. Generally speaking, musicians assign 
meaning to music through either of two perspectives: 1) that any meaning is the re ult of 
a priori elements of some fundamental truth in purely musical relationships, and 2) that 
meaning is the result of a priori elements of truth in the relationship of music to 
emotional response. These two assignments of meaning may be divided into the realms of 
theory (1) and aesthetics (2). Before discussing these categories in depth, however, some 
basic premises need to be defined. 
Recall Kingsley Price’s argument that  
 
If all works of art were true or false, each would be  
meaningful, i.e., would contain propositions or be  
constituted by them. This is to say that each work would  
refer to something other than itself in such a way that if  
that other thing existed, the work would correspond to it.86 
 
The first part of the argument may be paraphrased to describe musical truth s follows: 
the score that is musically true must contain propositions or be constituted by them.87
Music then, in terms of musical relationships, may be defined as meaningful only as far 
as those relationships are indeed proportionally logical. John Collins, in his article “Truth 
or Meaning? A Question of Priority,” offers some basic propositional schemas that 
                                                
86 Kingsley Blake Price, “Is There Artistic Truth?” 285. 
87 This idea refers to the argument that music can mean something other than itself. That an “A-E” 
relationship means something other than a simple change in frequency. 
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describe both sentential and propositional Deflationist theories of the relationships 
between truth and meaning. While Collins deals with language-based meaning, the 
schemas he describes provide useful constructs in defining meaning in music as well. 
Those deflationists who favor sentences as primary truth  
bearers…reflect this common theme by their appeal to the  
schema (T): 
 
   X is true (in L) iff p, 
 
Where each instance is formed by the substitution of ‘X’  
for a quotation (or structural description) of an L-sentence,  
and ‘p’ for a translation of the substitute of ‘X’. The truth  
predicate here is language relative, i.e., ‘L’ is a dummy letter  
designating a particular language (inclusive of idiolects), it is  
not a variable ranging over languages. Thus, an instance of (T)  
is  
 
(1) ‘Snow is white’ is true (in English) iff snow is  
white. 
 
Here the truth of ‘Snow is white’ is accounted for by the concepts  
therein expressed: the sentence is true just if snow is white.88  
 
While deflationist theory may suffer philosophically for trying to “explicate truth in terms 
of meaning,”89 it serves very well to describe meaning in musical relationships. One may 
use a quotation or structural description for X and may use musical language for L.  For 
example,  
(T): ‘V-I is a cadence’ is true (in Music/) iff V goes to I at the  
cadence.  
 
The usefulness of such a sentential definition of meaning in engaging Price’s 
propositional definition of artistic truth, however, remains doubtful as, according to Price,
music must contain propositions in order to be artistically true. Therefore, propositi ns 
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Vol. 65, No. 3 (Nov., 2002): 499. 
89 Ibid., 497. 
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must be true in order for X to be true. Fortunately, Collins offers an analogous schema for 
describing propositional truth (PT). 
Those deflationists who favor propositions as primary truth 
bearers…appeal to the schema (PT) as an analogue of (T): 
 
   (PT) the proposition that P is true iff p. 
   
That is that both hold that ‘P is true’ and ‘P’ are  
definitionally equivalent where ‘P’ is a dummy for the  
respective truth bearers appealed to.90 
 
This further explanation of meaning allows musical relationships to be fully exp ained as 
propositions. Therefore,  
(PT) ‘V-I is meaningful as a perfect authentic cadence’ is true iff V has been  
established as a polarized dominant in a hierarchical relationship to  
I. 
 
So for instance, V-I at the end of a Classical era sonata is both true as a cadence:  
[V-I = V-I], and as a proposition: [V-I is meaningful as a final cadence because V has 
been established as a polarized dominant in a hierarchical relationship to I]. Conversely, a 
V-I final cadence cannot be either sententially true or propositionally true in an atonal 
work. The atonal work lacks the ability to define either ‘X’ or ‘p’ as V-I and therefore 
cannot describe the musical relationship as true. Likewise, the atonal work lacks the 
proposition that a major triad built a perfect fifth away from a tonal center exists as part 
of a meaningful hierarchical relationship to that tonal center. All musical relationships 
therefore can only be meaningful according to the truthfulness of propositional 
relationships established by the conditions of musical language within individual works.  
While these schemas prove helpful in determining meaning as part of musical 
language, they do not quite address Price’s concern that artistic truth would entail each 
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work referring to something other than itself. The hazards in assigning meaning to 
interpretations lie also in the tendency of musicians and listeners to assign extra-musical 
meaning (usually in terms of emotional response) to the purely musical propositins in 
the score. Herein resides the crux of Price’s contention that if a work was true, “each 
work would refer to something other than itself in such a way that if that other thing 
existed, the work would correspond to it.” Price maintains that a musical proposition 
cannot be made to meaningfully correspond to “something other than itself.” The 
propositional schema of truth and meaning (PT) likewise fails to offer a useful mthod in 
describing the tendency of listeners to respond emotionally to music.  
Meaning cannot unerringly be assigned to rational truth in music precisely 
because of the simple fact that music is bound up in emotional response. Describing 
emotional response as a model across a group (or as a musical proposition) remains
notoriously difficult. The idea that great music may be described as artistically true based 
on its effectiveness in eliciting a similar emotional response from listeners of the same 
culture, experience, and historical period, cannot presume to describe anything other than 
popular trends. Likewise, the idea that music is a universal language, and as such will 
necessarily retain the same meaning across culture, experience, and history, al o proves 
problematic. The main point – that music is universally assigned meaning through 
emotional response even if that meaning differs from person to person and culture to 
culture – still remains valid. In order to describe assigned meaning beyond purely m sical 
relationships, one must incorporate aesthetics. While propositional schemas cannot 
describe how emotional response assigns meaning to musical language, aesthetics can.  
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Meaning: Performance and Aesthetic Response 
 
 
 Any aesthetic meaning assigned to music is by nature extra-musical. By 
describing a performance as “expressive” or “moving,” one has ceased to discuss the 
objective truth of the score, the subjective truth of performance variables in interpretation, 
or the subjective truth of interpretative analysis. Instead the performer has assigned 
certain meaningful values to the musical experience in attempting to describe its eff ct in 
aesthetic terms. Aesthetically, features of the emotional response to th  phenomenal 
experience of music must be determined before any discussion of extra-musicl meaning 
may take place.  
 Emotional responses to art and life take a number of different forms including 
cognitive, sympathetic, empathetic, and associative forms. When discussing music as the 
object of the response, the field narrows to two: sympathetic and associative.  
Aaron Ridley in his book Music, Value, and the Passions defines a sympathetic response 
as:  
  one elicited from a person in virtue of the expressive  
  features of an object perceived – features that, however, the  
  person does not think of as standing in significant relation to  
  anyone else’s passions (or to none but those of persons  
  similarly placed vis-à-vis the object). So that when, for  
  example, I am made melancholy by the sight of a weeping  
  willow, I do not suppose the willow to experience any  
  passion, and (unless I know or believe it to have been planted  
  for such reasons) neither do I suppose it to be the outward  
  manifestation of someone else’s passion. Rather, I recognize  
  in the willow features reminiscent of melancholy expressions  
  (its trailing drooping qualities) and respond to them by  
  becoming melancholy myself.91  
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The sympathetic response is inherently vague. Ridley states that one responds to features 
“reminiscent” of a particular emotion rather than any direct associati n of emotion with 
the feature itself. While vague, the sympathetic response fills an important role in 
categorizing that emotional response occurring without a material object.92 A foggy or 
rainy day may cause someone to respond by feeing gloomy. Yet (unless a picnic was 
planned), he is not specifically responding to the weather itself, but to certain features of 
the weather that remind him on an unconscious level of being sad.  One becomes sad 
when listening to “sad” music not because the music itself is sad, but because of certain 
features reminiscent of sadness (minor modes, descending motives, slow tempi, 
suspensions, etc.). While certain tropes and clichés often provide formulas for the mal 
expression of sadness, their inclusion within a work cannot make the music itself sad, any 
more than the music can manifest any other emotion. Although the composer may well 
be expressing personal or dramatic sadness, the appearance of sad codes in music does 
not inevitably mean the composer himself is sad. Additionally, one must keep in mind 
that music can only express sadness in conjunction with the sympathetic response of the 
listener. Given a different set of cultural codes (or a change in the listener’  mood), the 
same music may elicit a different response. The sympathetic response therefore 
categorizes the emotional response in the listener created by musical features without 
requiring the assignation of specific meaning to those features. When listening o late 
Beethoven for example, one may feel a sympathetic response to tragic and sublime 
features of the music without needing to assign meaning to specific musical phenomena. 
So, while music cannot truly correspond to or represent an extra-musical emotion, it can 
                                                




exhibit features reminiscent of that emotion. These features are then assig ed meaning 
through the sympathetic response of the listener. 
 The associative response in music bears some similarity with the sympathetic 
response (most notably in terms of elicited feelings) but retains distinct differences. 
Ridley states,  
  I respond to music associatively when it elicits the passion  
  in me that it does solely in virtue of the association that the  
  music has, for me, with something else, which would by  
  itself elicit that response.93  
Thus the sadness one may feel when listening to the third movement of Chopin’s B minor 
Sonata has everything to do with the funereal associations of the music rather than the 
music itself. The music does not reflect features of sadness as much as it associa es itself 
with a sad event. Chopin’s music, while not occasional, becomes associated with funeral 
music (and therefore grief and loss) through its use of distinctive rhythms used in 
functionally occasional funeral marches. When a piece references a specific experience, 
the associative response then assigns meaning through associating a correspondent reality 
(i.e. funeral marches with funerals).  
 The distinction between the sympathetic and associative responses may be seen
more clearly in relation to the objects of each response. Ridley posits, “When we 
experience emotion, we always experience emotion about something. This something is 
the object of our emotion.”94  
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Objects of emotion are then divided into two categories: material objects and formal
objects.   
  When I am afraid of your dog, or relieved by your failure,  
  your dog and your failure are the material objects of my  
  emotions. Any particular episode of emotion will take a  
  material object; and as fear of your dog and fear of, say,  
  botulism are apt to be dissimilar experiences, the character  
  of each instance of emotion is logically dependent upon the  
  nature of the material object taken.95 
 
The material object thus exhibits some useful characteristics. The material object is 
concretely defined, ensuring that any emotional response may be traced back to a specific 
source. Additionally, each episode of emotion can be distinguished by its material object.
The Baroque Doctrine of Affections was predicated on precisely this idea; music co ld 
act as a material object to emotion. Therefore, through creating rhetorical f mulas, one 
could employ music as a material object correlating a specific emotional response with a 
specific meaning. The problem, of course, is music’s ephemeral nature. What may elicit 
one type of response today cannot be counted upon to inevitably elicit that same response 
tomorrow (or, more relevantly, 300 years later). This inconsistency prevents music from 
functioning as a specific material object. 
 Cast in terms of the associative response, however, the material object may 
remain a constant outside of music yet still affect the music. If one feels sad at funerals, 
the material object of that sadness is the funeral. Sadness at hearing a funeral march 
simply expands the equation. The material object is still the funeral. However, inst ad of 
the phenomenal experience of a funeral eliciting the response, the response is elicit d 
through a musical reference to that experience. So the associative response may be linked 
                                                
95 Aaron Ridley, Music, Value and the Passions, 27. 
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with the material object in the following way: The associative response to a musical 
reference will create the same emotional response as the material object being referenced. 
 Ridley continues his example to describe the formal object.  
  Fear of your dog and fear of botulism do, however, have  
  this in common: in both cases the fear is a response to a  
  perceived threat. ‘The threatening,’ then, is the formal  
  object of fear, as ‘the welcome but not inevitable’ is the  
  formal object of relief.96  
The formal object thus represents the reason behind an emotional response. With all due 
respect to President Roosevelt, the emotion of fear arises from a formal object (a 
perceived threat) that may or may not apply to a material object. Thus, one needs no 
material object in order to experience fear. Walking down a dark alley at night i  a bad 
section of town may not employ a material object (one is not necessarily afra d of 
darkness, alleys, or buildings) but rather the perceived threat implied by the particular 
context (robbery, assault, etc.). Fear in this case needs only the formal object of a 
conceivable threat to one’s safety to function as an emotional response. 
 Colin Radford connects the formal object with the sympathetic response:  
 My contention is that although the sadness of pure music can  
 make us sad, i.e. we are saddened by it, we are not sad about  
 the music or its sadness…. The music is the focus of our  
 attention, its perceived sadness … makes us feel sad …, but  
 we are not sad … about or for the music or its perceived  
 emotional tone or property….These feelings … lack objects,  
 i.e. are not about anything.”97  
 
One might add to Radford’s point “These feelings… are not ab ut anything” in 
particular. Sadness in music exists only as a response. The music itself is not sad, even 
when explicitly expressing a composer’s emotional state of mind. Music inhabits the 
                                                
96 Aaron Ridley, Music, Value and the Passions, 27. 




same realm as the formal object; one where the emotional response is based upon the 
perceived emotional implications of the music. 
 Aesthetically then, emotional responses to music may be divided into two 
categories with corresponding objects: ASSOCIATIVE RESPONSE – MATERIAL OBJECT, and 
SYMPATHETIC RESPONSE – FORMAL OBJECT. One assigns meaning, therefore, as a result 
of specific aesthetic responses. One does not assign meaning through either haphazard 
moods, or through the music propositionally corresponding to some emotion. By tracing 
meaning through the objects of associative and sympathetic responses, one may clearly 
describe aesthetic meaning as a function of truth. A true interpretation therefore interprets 
the performance variables of the score through exploring how the score and performance 
variables function within the context of the aesthetic response. What is meaningful 
musically should create a correspondingly meaningful response in the listener. The final 
step in the process of assigning meaning is to determine how the propositional 







Meaning: Analysis and Phenomenological Intelligibility 
  
 Phenomenological intelligibility refers to that arrangement of sound shapes 
(phenomena) which fit together to communicate meaning (intelligibility). Price, in his 
article on music and meaning, describes intelligibility thus: 
  Consider the pieces of a picture puzzle in relation to the  
  picture. Some of the pieces put together in one way make a  
  branch, but put together in another make nothing at all.  
  Others put together in one way make a squirrel but put  
  together in another nothing at all. The branch and the  
  squirrel put together in one way make a branch supporting  
  a squirrel but put together in another nothing at all,  
  again, except the branch and squirrel in separation.  
  The shapes of the pieces enable the intelligible outcomes;  
  they enable the pieces to fit together into a branch, a  
  squirrel, and the whole picture of squirrel on branch. But  
  those very shapes explain, also, the unintelligibility of the  
  collections that result from putting the pieces together  
  differently—the unintelligibility of the collections that  
  make nothing at all.98 
 
To determine meaning, puzzle pieces have to be correctly fit together. The pieces taken 
alone can have no truthful meaning outside of the context of the corresponding, 
surrounding puzzle pieces. Once the pieces are fit together in an intelligible constru tion 
(shapes fit together with corresponding shapes), the resultant structure may achieve at 
least partial meaning (as a squirrel or tree branch), but only after all thepieces have been 
correctly fit together does each shape demonstrate completed meaning withi  the context 
of the picture as a whole. The intelligibility of each piece thus only manifests tself within 
the completed context of the puzzle. Of course, all of the pieces must be both considered 
                                                
98 Kingsley Price, “Does Music Have Meaning?” 203-4. 
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and appropriately matched together within the puzzle in order for the picture to be 
complete.  
 Likewise, to determine musical meaning, one must first include and consider 
every aspect of a musical work. Ridley states,  
  it is essential to understand that what one is hearing is music 
   – to hear what one hears, in other words, as music, and not  
  merely as an auditory stimulus of some unspecified kind, or  
  as noise.99  
 
Understanding that what one hears is music is akin to realizing that the pieces of a puzzle 
form a coherent whole. While one might try to fit random noises together, and may even 
be successful enough to assign meaning in a manner similar to Rorschach tests, musical 
meaning and phenomenological intelligibility depend on recognizing that music is not 
random.100  
 Price, in describing the specific phenomenological intelligibility inherent in 
coherent music, describes musical sound and shape as being specifically temporal in 
nature. 
 
A melody is a succession of notes that is coherent. Think of  
the notes that correspond to 'My country 'tis of thee, Sweet  
land of liberty, Of thee I sing' etc. These notes do not merely  
follow one another in time; they cling together in a single  
aural structure. You can hear that coherence easily by contrast.  
Change the temporal order of the notes in any way you please.  
Now you have notes that, following one another in time, do  
not make a single aural structure.101 
 
                                                
99 Aaron Ridley, Music, Value and the Passions, 51-2. 
100 Randomness is an intended component of Aleatoric music. The random expression, however, is still 
controlled as part of a musical work specifically intended by a composer. So, while the details may indeed 
be randomly expressed, that random expression still falls under the phenomenological intelligibility of the 
score as music.  
101 Kingsley Price, “Does Music Have Meaning?” 207.  
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Whether the music is tonal or not, Price ascribes the intelligibility of a particular melodic 
shape (one may also include harmony or specific pitches) to a specific temporal context. 
In doing so, Price simply provides a philosophical construct for Schoenberg’s description 
of motivic cohesion. Such coherence preserves essential parts as motivic identifiers 
across a work.102 In this way, one “remembers” a melodic shape even as specific details 
of that motive are varied.103  As the tonal composer chooses certain musical shapes 
within the context of tonality, so also do atonal and serial composers choose certain 
shapes within the correspondingly specific contexts of their music. Musical 
phenomenological intelligibility requires that the pitches, harmonies, melodic shapes, and 
formal structures all fit together in some meaningful way over the temporal existence of a 
given work. 
 Ridley, in discussing Price’s usage of phenomenological intelligibility, state  
  “Phenomenological intelligibility” is thus distinctive of  
  music and allows it to be separated off from the other  
  possible objects of auditory experience. Tonality is the  
  condition of the “demanding” characteristic of music, so  
  that within tonal music the satisfaction or frustration of  
  such demands (of tones for each other) is what makes a  
  melody coherent or incoherent. To hear a pitch as the  
  seventh in the scale is to hear a tone which demands that  
  the tonic should follow soon, a demand which does not  
  lapse when the tonic fails so to follow, but rather persists,  
  spanning whatever tones succeed the seventh to yield an  
  entire succession that without the tonic is incoherent,  
  and that with the tonic is coherent.104 
 
                                                
102 For example, a tonal answer found in a fugue is recognized primarily by its preservation of the rhythm 
and melodic contour of the subject. While not being a  exact transposition, the listener hears it in all 
essentials as the subject. 
103 Arnold Schoenberg, The Musical Idea and the Logic, Technique, and Art of i s Presentation, edited and 
translated by Patricia Carpenter, Severine Neff (New York, NY: Colombia University Press, 1995), 21-43.  
104 Aaron Ridley, Music, Value and the Passions, 52-53. 
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So, according to Ridley and Price, what makes music different from random sound i 
precisely the meaning assigned to each sound by the surrounding context.105 An E pitch 
will sound differently depending on the tonal (or atonal) context and therefore may have 
different meanings depending on the context. Only by analyzing the surrounding context
can one hope to determine the meaning of that specific statement of E. One may thus 
describe phenomenological intelligibility as the meaningful relationships of component 
parts (either micro or macro) to the whole.   
 Music is fundamentally phenomenologically intelligible. This intelligibility exists 
on every level. Since music exhibits phenomenological intelligibility on every level, the 
interpreter excludes certain relationships at his peril. Interpretation must meaningfully 
engage macro relationships in order to assign meaning to the micro relationships, while 
ensuring the micro relationships fit together appropriately to create the macro 
relationships. 
 
Meaning: Programs and Phenomenological Intelligibility 
 
 
 If music demonstrates phenomenologically intelligible shapes on a micro level 
(for example, the coherent shape of a melody), then it will also be intelligible on a macro 
level (the coherent shape of one part within a multi-part work). In dealing with music 
with extra-musical references, exploring how these extra-musical references become part 
of the music’s phenomenological intelligibility should allow a more rigorous vetting of 
how those extra-musical elements exert influence over the score’s musical relationships. 
                                                
105 It is important to note that Ridely is not attempting to describe music as being the sole possessor of 
phenomenological intelligibility, but is attempting to distinguish music (with its meaningful sound 
structures and shapes) from random non-phenomenologica ly intelligible auditory experiences. Any sound 
structure or shape that retains meaning may be considered phenomenologically intelligible. 
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Thus, instead of relying on primary extant sources describing how the composer adds a 
program to the score (insert programmatic element A into musical event B), one may 
instead determine the musical elements’ programmatic meaning by extending the 
phenomenologically intelligible elements of musical relationships within the score to 
include the program. 
 Regarding the score, any extra-musical program will exist as part of the broader 
“paratext” of the work. Gerard Genette in his book Paratexts states, 
 Indeed, this fringe [the paratext], always the conveyor of a  
 commentary that is authorial or more or less legitimated by the  
 author, constitutes a zone between text and off-text, a zone not only  
 of transition but also of transaction...of an influence on the public,  
 an influence that – whether well or poorly understood and achieved  
 – is at the service of a better reception for the text and a more 
 pertinent reading of it.106 
 
The program therefore acts as a guide to the composer’s desires regarding assigned 
meaning. The paratextual elements of a program also act on the phenomenological 
intelligibility of the work by providing a more focused lens through which to study the 
more intricate musical relationships. 
 Programs in music generally function in one of two ways: either by providing a 
specific narrative meaning (and often formal structure), or by providing a broade  poetic 
meaning to an arguably independent formal structure. For example, the program of 
Beethoven’s sixth symphony provides a poetic program striving to create the proper
atmosphere in which to understand and respond to the music. Berlioz’s Symphonie 
Fantastique on the other hand (with the music mimicking the artist’s severed head) 
demonstrates a more narrative program.  
                                                
106 Gerard Genette, Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation, 2. 
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 Aesthetically, a narrative program functions as the material object of an 
associative response. When one listens to the “galloping” motives in Mazeppa, one will 
associate the horse in the program with that particular rhythmic pattern. One’s emotional 
response need not be similar to another’s (the response will depend upon a number of 
other associative variables), however the emotional response will always be tied to the 
material object – the program’s reference to a galloping horse. The narrative program 
serves the listener by identifying precise events where the program and usic 
synchronize. The program thus provides formal structure and meaning to the musical 
gestures as well as enabling the listener to assign meaning to his emotional response.   
 The poetic program, however, serves as a formal object eliciting a sympathetic 
response. Thus Johannes Kreisler is not mimicked in Schumann’s Kreisleriana by a 
particular motive, nor can one trace literary phenomena in Hoffmann’s narratives to 
corresponding musical phenomena in the score. Indeed, even the question of which 
Hoffmann narrative should be referred to as a program remains ambiguous. The goal of 
the poetic program is not to provide meaning to specific musical gestures, but rather to 
describe more fully “ideal, poetic content, which is the goal of music in general.”107  
 While the narrative program provides concrete evidence of relevance and value in 
terms of ascribing meaning to the score, it can imply that the musical relationships retain 
less musical meaning because of their obvious illustrative relationship to the program.108 
The poetic program allows the musical relationships to retain more of their purly
musical meaning, but presents many of the same relativistic dangers exhibited when 
                                                
107 H. Ch. Koch, "Tonmalerei," in H. Ch. Koch´s Musikalisches Lexicon, ed. Arrey von Dommer 
(Heidelberg: Academische Verlagsbuchhandlung von J.C.B. Mohr, 1865),  873-75. Special thanks to Sanna 
Pederson for referring this source. 
108 This illustrative purpose of music is exactly what Schopenhauer decries when it uses an extra-musical 
text to provide formal coherence for the musical relationships. 
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determining meaning through performance. Because of the dearth of explicit paratextual 
relationships, any analysis attempting to illuminate interpretive meaning through a poetic 
program becomes vulnerable to charges of eisegesis.109 If a poetic program is to be useful, 
it must meaningfully connect with the objective score in a logically coherent way without 
slipping into subjective illustration.110 
 Since a poetic program cannot provide explicit meaning, determining that an 
auditory experience is indeed music remains of primary importance. A poetic rogram set 
over random noise might yield surprisingly “fruitful” interpretive analyses as most 
anything heard might be correlated with most anything in the program. One must beware 
of assigning meaning (by no means intended by the composer or performer) yet failing to 
increase truthful understanding. If, by virtue of music’s phenomenological intelligibility, 
one can recognize that sounds are indeed meaningful to one another (and therefore 
musical), then paratextual poetic programs (whether official or unofficial) should 
enhance the overall phenomenological intelligibility of those sounds. Applying 
paratextual programmatic meaning to abstract music as part of a larger consideration of 
the piece’s phenomenological intelligibility allows the performer to assign extra-musical 
meaning to a musical score. One may then avoid subjective extremes in one’s 
interpretation by maintaining paratextual meaning according to the phenomenological 
intelligibility of the score. 
 The usefulness of any poetic program to a musical work will remain directly 
proportional to the degree that it increases the score’s phenomenological intelligibility.  
                                                
109 Eisegesis refers here to the interpreter “reading into” a text, or attributing meaning to a particular text 
that is not borne out by the textual elements themselve .  
110 While interpretation remains subjective (as with performance), one’s recognition of the subjective 
decisions inherent in applying the poetic program should help prevent a wholesale appropriation of the 
score for purely arbitrary musical ideas. 
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By applying the paratextual poetic program to the score, one assigns truthful meaning to 
the work. By denying the poetic program its intended role, the interpretation is cut adrift 
from its contextual moorings and thus becomes even more subject to the whims of the 
interpreter. One cannot ignore his responsibility as a performer to work out the 
paratextual implications of a poetic program, but must clearly define his position in order 
to provide a stable foundation from which to determine how the poetic program increases 
the phenomenological intelligibility of the score. 
 
Conclusions: Truth, Meaning, and Aesthetic Response 
 
 
Before progressing to a discussion of interpretation, the interpreter’s fundamental 
positions must be declared and boundaries of truth and meaning described. There are 
three components to an interpretation, ranging from the abstract objective truth of the 
score to the subjective phenomenal meaning assigned by the performer.  
The musical score forms the first component of an interpretation and manifests 
three distinct qualities:   
1. The musical score exists as an abstraction.  
2. As an abstraction, the score remains objectively true because it remains free from any 
subjective influences of phenomenal reality.  




 The musical performance forms the second component of an interpretation and 
likewise manifests three distinct qualities:  
1. The musical performance exists as an actualization.  
2. As an actualization of an abstract objective truth, the musical performance is 
subjectively true. 
3. As an actualization of the musical score, the musical performance is limited by he
score and cannot represent any meaning beyond the phenomenological intelligibility 
of the musical relationships within the score. 
  Finally, in the phenomenal experience of music, the interpreter assigns aesthetic 
meaning to the musical relationships to elicit a desired emotional response in the listener.  
This assigned aesthetic meaning, the third component of interpretation, represents the 
final three qualities:  
1. Aesthetic meaning is relative to the interpreter’s phenomenal experience and 
therefore a subjective truth.  
2. Although the phenomenal experience of the interpreter conditions the interpretation, 
it in no way determines either the objective truth of the score, or the subjective tru h 
of the performance. Rather, the breadth and sophistication of the interpreter’s 
phenomenal experience will only determine the degree to which he is able to 
accurately convey both the objective truth of the score, and the subjective truth of the 
performance.  
3. Both the score and the phenomenal intelligibility of the musical relationships remain 























Georg Faust (c. 1480-1540)111 described himself as  
Demigod from Heidelberg, Philosopher of Philosophers,  
Magister Georgius Sabellicus, Faustus junior, wellspring of  
necromancers, astrologer, second magus, chiromancer,  
aeromancer, second in the art of hydromancy.112  
 
History, however, has been somewhat less impressed. In his commentary, John Williams 
writes,  
Nevertheless, there are no reliable contemporary judgments  
on Faust that cast him in a remotely favorable light,  
and it was no doubt his very notoriety that led, in the forty  
or so years after his death, to the accretion of the most  
sensational and scandalous anecdotes and superstitions  
around his name.113  
 
While Goethe’s Faust may bear only a passing likeness to the actual hisorical character, 
Franz Liszt knit at least a few of the original’s characteristics together in himself (not the 
least of which being a knack for marketing).  
Goethe’s portrayal of Faust resonated strongly with Liszt, an affinity which found 
expression in a number of his compositions. Much in Goethe’s Fau t appealed to Liszt’s 
gothic imagination and taste – diabolical pacts, supernatural powers, duels, seduction, 
damnation and redemption – all of which provided excellent theatrical fodder for musical 
inspiration. However, apart from Liszt’s residency in Weimar in the second half of his 
life, what other connections exist to demonstrate that Goethe’s Fau tshould be 
                                                
111 According to John Williams, the dates are widely accepted but the evidence is meager. 
John R. Williams, Goethe’s Faust (London, UK: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 4. 
112 Ibid., 4. 
113 Ibid., 5. 
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considered as paratext to the Sonata in B minor? The Faust Symphony provides an 
obvious example of Liszt’s attempts to capture the play in music. Connecting Faust to the 
Sonata, given the lack of any explicit reference to the play in the score, prv s a bit more 
challenging. 
Liszt’s practice habits in his youth were and still are legendary. Rather than 
merely run his fingers exhaustively over technical exercises, Liszt used hi  time at the 
keyboard to serve a dual purpose. According to the lesson diary of Mme. Auguste 
Boissier, “He [Liszt] does all this [extensive finger exercise at the keyboard] for hours on 
end, while at the same time reading to avoid boredome [sic]. This is the time, as he 
exercises his fingers, that he meditates over his readings.”114 While Liszt’s command of 
the instrument might lead one to believe his reading was merely casual, Arnold writes,  
 From the beginning to the end of his life, Liszt remained  
actively engaged in the literary, philosophical, and religious  
thought of his day. He read a minimum of 240 different  
authors and hundreds of volumes of poetry, prose, essays,  
history and scholarship. It is nearly impossible to separate  
adequately his music from the intensity of his reading.115 
 
Indeed, while Liszt’s writings and research frequently come under fire for lax scholarship, 
bias, and some overtly racist overtones (most likely inserted by his editor), they repr sent 
quite a notable accomplishment for a man who was almost completely self-taught.116 
Additionally, he pursued his education and research while heavily invested in a host of 
other professional and private activities. Arnold sets forth and cross-references a umber 
of lists describing Liszt’s reading repertoire and charting the frequency with which Liszt 
                                                
114 Auguste Boissier, “Liszt Pedagogue: A Diary of Franz Liszt as Teacher 1821-32,” in The Liszt Studies, 
translated and edited by Elyse Mach, (New York: NY, 1973), xiii.  
115 Ben Arnold, “Liszt as Reader, Intellectual, and Musician,” In Liszt and his World: Proceedings of the 
International Liszt Conference held at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 20-23 May 1993, 
edited by Michael Saffle, (Stuyveasant, NY: Pendragon Press, 1998), 48. 




read or referenced books more than once.117 According to Arnold, Liszt spent far more 
time with Goethe’s Faust than any other work – either reading or referencing the work 
across twelve years of his life.118 While Liszt did read a number of other works, any of 
which might possibly be an influence on his Sonata, Faust was a dominant, recurring 
theme throughout his life and reading. 
 
The Interface Between Paratext and Music 
 
 
 If Faust was indeed a recurring theme throughout Liszt’s life, how does that relate 
to his music? The Faust Symphony of Liszt consists of three character studies (Faust, 
Gretchen, and Mephistopheles) but does not represent a comprehensive parallel work to 
Goethe’s play. Indeed, no work of Liszt’s may be said to be narratively representative of 
Goethe’s Faust. If the play is to be related to the musical score as a paratext in a 
phenomenologically intelligible way, the interface must be more subtly designed. 
 Through understanding the lingua franca of poetic-musical trends in song cycles, 
a reference point can be established for understanding the interface between parat xt and 
music. In her article “The Early 19th Century Song Cycle,” Ruth Bingham discussed two 
models composers used when setting poetry to music: External-plot cycles, and Inter al-
plot cycles.   
  
                                                
117 See Appendix II. 
118 Including the years: 1830, 1837-41, 1844, 1849, 1854, 1857, 1876-77, 1885. 
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 The external-plot cycle refers to 
   sets of songs excerpted from a narrative context….Their  
structures vary widely, from quasi-dramatic settings of  
every poem in the novel to a few lyric moments excerpted 
haphazardly….In general, however, the weaker the literary  
connections, the stronger the musical ones, which relates  
back to the unity and diversity aesthetic: music does not  
mirror the text, but balances it.”119 
 
Two crucial points to note: an entire narrative may be conveyed through “a few lyric 
moments,” and the “music does not mirror the text, but balances it.” Because music exist  
in time and employs time as an integral feature of its existence, common narrative 
devices do not necessarily translate. Whereas one may write a short poem describing fifty 
years worth of life experience, one cannot similarly mature a musical theme in such a 
short time-span. Generally, the real-time reading process is not a factor in reating 
literary distance. In music however, one needs real-time, that is, duration, to establish key 
and harmonic relationships, and to hear central motivic and melodic elements as famili r. 
In listening to J. S. Bach’s Goldberg Variations for example, the difference in the final 
statement of the theme has everything to do with the thirty variations (generally ranging 
between sixty and seventy minutes duration) separating it from the original statement. A 
formal model allowing the excerpting of specific moments from a literary n rative 
allows the composer to choose certain dramatic or lyrical moments to describe the 
narrative arc within a real-time experience. 
 Secondly, the idea that music may balance the text rather than merely miror 
it,frees true programmatic music from the spurious charge of mere mimicry. Music 
mirroring a text at best remains somewhat unoriginal and at worst becomes emotionally 
                                                
119 Ruth O. Bingham, “The Early 19th Century Song Cycle,” The Cambridge Companion to  
the Lied, Edited by James Parsons, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 108. 
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manipulative. Music designed to balance a program, however, to complement and 
transcend the program, remains truly music. So the External-plot model creat s a rubric 
accomplishing two things it allows composers to frame a musical work with a few 
excerpted literary moments, and eliminates any need for merely imitative music. 
 The Internal-plot cycle refers to “cycles in which the poetry relates  
narrative…the idea of conveying a drama through a series of lyric poems.”120 Here the 
drama, to a certain extent, takes place outside of the actual poetry. For example, Ernest 
Hemingway’s famous six-word short story “For Sale: baby shoes, never worn” allows all 
its drama and tragedy to take place outside of its actual words. Internal-plot cycles 
likewise allow much of the dramatic impetus to take place outside the bounds of the 
actual poetry. 
 Whereas the External-plot cycle excerpts dramatic and lyrical moments from an 
existing (complete) narrative, the Internal-plot cycle creates narrative structure through a 
series of lyric poems. Put another way, the External-plot cycle determines its measure of 
drama or lyricism based on the materials excerpted from the narrative. The Internal-plot 
cycle creates drama and narrative through the sequence of lyric poems.  
The model that seems most useful in describing the interface between the Sonata 
in B minor and Faust is the External-plot model. Liszt’s music generally depends on 
thematic material for organization and cohesion. Faust likewise depends on its characters 
to provide dramatic drive. The characters of Faust are not beset by fate; rather, the 
characters retain the freedom to determine their fate through their choices. While 
dramatic events certainly do take place, they are always predicated by the internal dramas 
of the characters themselves.  
                                                
120 Ruth Bingham, The Early Nineteenth-century Song Cycle, 110. 
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Liszt’s Sonata does not seem to function simply in terms of dramatic events 
excerpted from Faust. Even in his Faust Symphony, a piece clearly linked to the play, 
Liszt does not employ a narrative series of dramatic events. Rather, Liszt’s focus on the 
characters offers the listener a glimpse into Liszt’s interpretation of their inner world 
through a musical distilling of their fundamental identities. Just as the characters in Faust 
shape events through their personalities, so also do Liszt’s themes, in both the symphony 
and the sonata, shape their surrounding formal structures. Since Faust is a character-
driven drama, and Liszt’s Sonata in B minor is a thematically driven piece, fruitful 
parallels may be drawn between the characters of Faust and the major themes of the 
Sonata.  







Faust: Major Characters and Paratextually Correspondent Themes in  






Example 9-1: Mephistopheles Theme mm. 1-17 
As the most powerful force in the sonata, the Mephistopheles theme (mm 1-17) must be 
considered the primary thematic material. Although not reiterated in its entirety (after the 
76 
 
opening), nor developed through classical variation/fragmentation technique, its 
diabolical nature still recognizably cuts through the different textures. If Mephistopheles 
is indeed connected to this theme, his characteristic qualities must be evident in the 
different manifestations of the theme. If so, one can describe them as being legitimate 
analogues of literary material. After identifying the theme with its paratextual character, 
one can draw meaningful conclusions about the formal functions and interpretation of the 
theme.  
Goethe’s antagonist Mephistopheles appears in six different guises throughout the 
course of the narrative. Far more than mere disguises, or a tour de force for the costume 
designers, each represents a specific attribute of Mephistopheles as welld monstrating 
the true nature (on a large scale) of both temptation and the Devil. In other words, the use 
of disguise is not the key to Mephistopheles’ deception. Even Mephistopheles states:  
I am quite accustomed to go incognito  
 But one wears one’s orders on gala days you know121 
 
His true deception lies in the fact that he quite freely and candidly presents his 
true nature, knowing others will disregard that truth and assign him better motives. As 
Mephistopheles observes of Gretchen at one point,  
 She reads some hidden sense behind my little mask 
 She feels that I am assuredly a genius – 
 Maybe the devil if she dared to ask.122 
 
Again, Mephistopheles is not trying to disguise his true nature and seems quite willing to 
be completely forthcoming with Gretchen if she dares to ask the truth. Mephistopheles 
sees no need to reconcile his cavalier attitude with his diabolical power. Even Faust 
                                                
121 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Faust, translated by Louis MacNeice, edited by Victor  
Lange (New York, NY: Continuum Publishing Company, 1994), 129. 
122 Ibid., 107.  
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exclaims in frustration, “You are and remain a Sophist and a liar”123 as well as “You 
spirit of contradiction!”124 Mephistopheles does not deliberately deceive others, but rather 
allows others’ own vices and desires to misrepresent his intentions.  
If Mephistopheles is not trying to deceive through disguise, why does he seem to 
take great pleasure in donning various characters? Each character represents the 
fundamental dualism inherent in Mephistopheles: namely, the tension found between 
relatively absolute powers confined within pre-determined limits.125 The six guises 
Mephistopheles assumes – a traveling scholar, a young squire, a noble Baron, a Demon 
(although this guise proves more self-reference than pseudonym), a Foreman, and 
Phorcys –fall into two distinct categories.  
The scholar, squire, and Baron all have a distinguishing measure of freedom to 
move about the world and through different social strata. As Williams states, “[Mephisto] 
has become secularized with the times and now moves incognito among humanity, no 
less dangerously or effectively for all that.”126 Additionally, these guises all exert some 
control over their environment through either education or social standing. Each is 
beholden to a societal order, however, and is powerless to change its destiny as regards 
that system. The scholar may not readily venture into the realm of the practical without 
gaining experience further than what may be learned in a book. (A military scholar may 
not necessarily make a good General even though he can list and define military strategy.) 
The squire is part of the aristocratic (and at Faust’s time, feudal) hierarcy nd a Baron 
(while socially, politically, and militarily powerful) is still subservient to a King. Indeed, 
                                                
123 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Faust, 83. 
124 Ibid., 127. 
125 Mephistopheles, while not omnipotent, is allowed to be nearly so in regard to Faust’s desires. 
126 John Williams, Goethe’s Faust, 96. 
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the play begins with the conditions and boundaries set forth by the Almighty on 
Mephistopheles regarding the temptation of Faust.  
So long as he [Faust] walks the earth alive, 
So long you may try what enters your head;127  
 
It is these limits that keep Mephistopheles from manifesting the complete corruption 
hinted at by Gretchen: “He gives me a horror I cannot tell.”128 So the guises of squire, 
Baron, and scholar represent the limitations placed on Mephistopheles’ freedom.  
The other three guises, Demon, Phorcys, and Foreman, represent the (nearly) 
absolute power of Mephistopheles on this earth. While he does have boundaries on what 
he may do to Faust, he reigns supreme in what he may do for Faust and manages to warp 
time and space, this world and the netherworld, in relation to Faust’s desires. The witches 
in Faust are extremely powerful. As their Demon ruler, Mephistopheles certainly must be 
more powerful. The association with Phorcys evokes a pagan deity as well a a certain 
virility in begetting other powerful beings.129 The Foreman represents a managerial 
authority (in this case over lesser demons) with the power to make decisions on his ow  
behalf free from the chain of command.  These dual aspects of Mephistopheles, the 
freedom to move about and affect events both perceptibly and imperceptibly, as well
the power to change the fabric of reality as he wills, offer a striking resemblance to the 
functions of the primary theme in the Sonata in B minor. The primary theme generally 
operates in one of these two categories (absolute power/incognito-freedom). These 
                                                
127 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Faust, 5. 
128 Ibid., 105. 
129 A Greek god, father of the Gorgons (including Medusa) and the Dragon Ladon.  
Robert J. Lenardon, Mark P. O. Morford, Classical Mythology, 8th edition (New York NY: Oxford 
University Press Inc., 2007), 162. 
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different qualities of Mephistopheles can be observed in the sympathetic responses 
created by the primary theme in different contexts.  
The exposition or first “section” of the Sonata is dominated by the primary 
theme.130 Indeed, the impetus for much of the Sonata’s virtuosity is derived from this 
primary material. The opening, as well as the octave passage in mm. 8-12, revel 
unequivocally in their own power.131 However, the rolled diminished chords at the end of 
the opening (mm 15, 17) remain controversial.132 Even a cursory sampling of recorded 
interpretations reveals a wide divergence of opinion as to the character of these chords. 
Are they ironic, seductive, or just flat out evil and ugly? It would seem from the Goethe 
text that Mephistopheles (even under extreme duress) never loses his wit or charm. 
Therefore, to play the chords in the bravura manner of the preceding material seems a bit 
out of character. To interpret them sarcastically or seductively (as Liszt often uses the 
diminished seventh chord to indicate) seems a better choice. During mm. 141-152 the 
question becomes one of prominence.  
  
                                                
130 See Appendix III for formal diagram. 
131 See example 9-1 
132 See example 9-1 
 
Example 9
As the Mephistopheles material from mm. 141
idea occurs at m. 153), the Mephistopheles thematic event should not 
Here an excellent opportunity arises to show the dark character of the theme incognito, a 
premonition rather than a
during the close of the first section
but this time leads decisively into a strenuously asertive example of the demonic power 
of Mephistopheles in mm
ambiguous harmony in m
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-2: Mephistopheles Material mm. 141-152 
-152 is transitional (a new the
be overemphasized.
 climactic event. The climactic thematic event finally happens
 at mm. 319-330 . Here the figure repeats in the bass 
. 319- 321 before dying away to a murmur and a rather 










Example 9-3: Mephistopheles Material mm. 319-330 
Another example of possible ambiguity as to interpretation arises in mm. 297-300, 








Arrau mentions that,  
The important thing here is the staccatissimo. This is never  
done – separating the chords. I don’t know why… The  
six-four chord, which always creates tension, here sounds  
ironic. Whereas next, in the first position, the chords are  
drohend, threatening.133 
 
While mm. 297-305 are in fact the Almighty material, here they are being aped by 
Mephistopheles. The “threatening” quality therefore is altogether appropriate. 
While the “development” second section of the sonata takes place without 
Mephistopheles, the beginning of the third section (recapitulation) serves up a different 
vision of Mephistopheles, this time terrifying through its quietude. Indeed, the piano 
nature of this fugue allows one to imagine the diabolical laughter having bee going on 
far longer than has been perceived by the listener. This time, no moderating influence 
tempers his authority. Mephistopheles ushers in both the third section and the exact return 
of the “Exposition” (first section) material. The Più Mosso serves to further tighten the 
tension, as the texture begins to gallop out of control.  
  
                                                





Example 9-5: Mephistopheles Material mm. 553-569 
The ultimate triumph of Mephistopheles however, is not to be. Beginning at  
m 750 the opening material of the primary theme is heard cut loose from the closing 









The power of Mephistopheles contrasts with his general state of ennui. He has 
walked the earth for generations and seen everything. Faust’s character, however, is a 
study in violent covetousness and despair. In a sense, Faust becomes an “anti-Midas,” 
corrupting and destroying all he touches. Gretchen is destroyed mentally, morally, and 
physically as well as nearly being lost spiritually. His love child with Helen of Troy 
presumably inherits Faust’s desires and falls to his death attempting to fly (Icarus, Adam, 
and the tower of Babel provide similar studies), Faust’s effort to evict an old couple ff 
their land ends in a triple homicide, yet throughout all these tragedies, Faust continues to 
desire more even while lamenting his own loss and corruption. Indeed Faust’s 




Long live the man who does not flinch!  
 But you’ve a devil in you, somewhere there. 
 I know of nothing on earth more unattractive  
  Than your devil who feels despair.134 
 
Mephistopheles regards Faust’s despair (rather than his covetousness) as hi fundamental 
weakness and this despair is what Mephistopheles exploits. Before they meet, Faust 
despairs because he does not have, and then despairs because he does not have more. 
Mephistopheles, however, gives him all that he desires, hoping that eventually Faust will 
despair even of his own desire. Mephistopheles may then claim victory and Faust’s so l. 
Faust’s yearning, rather than being assuaged by the unlimited satiation of his desires, is 
actually exponentially increased. This yearning ultimately defines Faust’s character.  
The original statement of the Mephistophelean theme may be divided into three 
parts: the opening chromatic descent from g, the statement in double octaves (beginning 
at the Allegro energico), and the ascending statement in the bass mm. 13-17.135 The final 
cell, an embellished stepwise progression from d-f#, provides the material for the Faust 
theme mm. 153-174.   
                                                
134 Johann  Wolfgang von Goethe, Faust, 99. 




Example 9-7: Faust Theme mm. 153-170 
In creating a new thematic character out of material previously associted with 
Mephistopheles, Liszt (through thematic transformation) retains musical cogen y while 
vividly contrasting the pathos of the Faust theme with the diabolical intensity of 
Mephistopheles. The new theme, set in major and achieving a certain lilt through the 
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accompanying triplets, offers both a change in mode and rhythmic drive. 
 
Example 9-8: Mephistophelse material mm. 179-190 
The individual ascending statements are connected through chromatic scales, 
giving the entire section an anguished sense (a sympathetic response) of reaching for the 
unattainable. The background presence of the Mephistopheles theme continues to be 
demonstrated through its capacity for interruption and its propensity for warping the 
Faust material into itself. Additionally, the lack of real direction toward a cadence in this 
section proves a stark difference to the driving power of the Mephistophelean 
passagework. As seen in Example 9-7, the much-anticipated arrival at m. 169 proves 
frustratingly circular as D major heralds the new statement at m. 171. 
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The kaleidoscopic variation and modulation offer another contrast with the 
character of Mephistopheles. Whereas Liszt directs the energy of the Mephistophelean 
theme toward a single diabolical goal, the energy of the Faust theme, although derived 
from the same material, constantly evaporates through its lack of closure. The Faust 
theme, with its half-step creep, lack of satisfying cadences, and circular arrival points, 





If Mephistopheles and Faust represent one side in the drama, the two characters 
representing the other are the Almighty and Gretchen. Given the subject matter of the 
play, the role of the Almighty is surprisingly small (limited to the opening prologue when 
determining the limits of Mephistopheles’s power).136 The Almighty subsequently 
remains very much in the background of the drama. However, it would be a mistake to 
assume that the lack of speaking lines implies a reduced role in determining the eventual 
outcome. The Almighty, in Faust, simply prefers to work through proxy.  
  
                                                




In her article “Expressive Resonance in Liszt’s Piano Music,” Dolores Pesce 
comments on the relationship between the theme presented at m. 105 and the “cross 
motive” in Liszt’s oratorio, St. Elisabeth:137 
 We do know that Liszt labeled the opening motive of theme  
2 [the Grandioso theme: mm. 105-6, Sonata in B minor]  
the ‘Cross motive’ in its appearance in the oratorio St.  
Elisbeth. Furthermore, the same motive can also be found  





Example 9-9: Almighty Theme mm. 105-106 
This theme demonstrates the strongest associative link with extra-musical content in the 
entire piece. However, one cannot claim the theme in Liszt’s sonata creates an associative 
response with Christian imagery in the listener. While some scholars place Liszt’s first 
work on his St. Elisabeth oratorio as early as 1854, the Sonata was completed in 1853. 
Therefore, listeners would have had no way of making the associative connection 
                                                
137 The “cross” motive is defined by Pesce as the motive (C-A-G). 
Dolores Pesce, “Liszt’s sacred choral music,” The Cambridge Companion to Liszt, edited by Kenneth 
Hamilton (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 231. 
138 Dolores Pesce, “Expressive Resonance in Liszt’s Piano Music,” 384. 
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between the oratorio and the sonata. In terms of the composition, however, Liszt may 
very well have associated the two in his mind and listeners today may associate the two 
together. Ultimately, if one views the theme in the context of Liszt’s oeuvre,  the 
association certainly appears valid for Liszt. 
Additionally, the late Liszt work Sursum Corda of 1877 uses nearly identical 
textures, sonorities, and voicing to elicit a sympathetic response of reverence and awe.  
 
 
Example 9-10: Sursum Corda mm. 6-15 
 
While there is no hard evidence to justify tracking Christian symbolism in the Sonata, the 
striking similarity between the textures surrounding the “Almighty” theme and the 
texture of Sursum Corda circumstantially demonstrates a sympathetic association with 
some transcendent higher power. So, both associatively and sympathetically, the 
grandioso theme retains links to the Almighty. While the theme is not a driving force in 
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the Sonata, it appears in all three sections and is extensively interwoven with Faus  and 





Although the Almighty and Mephistopheles are supernatural beings clearly in 
opposition to one another, Grethcen and Faust’s relationship is more complicated. Whil 
they remain tied to their respective supernatural hosts, they do both truly love each other. 
Gretchen, perhaps the least complicated character in the play, becomes the only hope for 
Faust’s redemption. At first, Gretchen represents a pure ideal of Catholic womanh od – 
innocent of all evil. Faust’s seduction of her (aided by Mephistopheles) initiates a moral 
descent of dire consequences: Gretchen accidentally poisons her mother, sees her brother 
killed in a duel with Faust (again aided by Mephistopheles), gives birth to an illegitimate 
child, commits infanticide, and is driven nearly insane by her own guilt and 
Mephistopheles’s demons. When Faust tries to save Gretchen from prison before her 
execution for murder, she refuses and regains her faith subsequently dying in a state of
grace. Gretchen then spends the rest of the play praying for Faust’s soul in Heaveand 
eventually is the reason for Faust’s redemption. In effect, Gretchen assumes the role of 
the Virgin Mary in Catholic dogma and successfully intercedes on behalf of Faust. t, 
for his part, never loses his love for Gretchen and is eventually redeemed by it.  





Example 9-11: Gretchen Theme mm. 124-139 
The theme is set in the manner of a recitative with its rhapsodic character, 
dynamic hue, and rhythmic structures all set in contrast to the Mephistopheles and Faust 
themes. Whereas the Mephistopheles theme uses chromatic inflection, dissonant trit e 
intervals, sharp dynamic shifts, and double-dotted rhythms to sympathetically reference 
menace, the Gretchen theme transforms the basic outline of the Mephistopheles them  
through augmented rhythms, melodic ornamentation, and consonant harmonies. In 
addition, Liszt modifies the contradictory Mephistophelean Le to assisi – Allegro 
energico tempo marking to the gentler dolce con grazia.   
Regarding pacing, the Gretchen theme offers more freedom to linger than any 
other theme in the piece. The freedom to linger marks a dramatic shift in the use of 
rhythmic drive for the thematic material. In fact, no other theme allows anything of the 
sort. The Mephistopheles theme is too rhythmically and harmonically unstable, the 
Almighty theme is set against a kinetic harmonic rhythmic support, and the Faust theme 
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with its duple melody against a triplet accompaniment never quite gets settled. The 
rhythmic structure for the Gretchen theme, while arguably a simple augmentation of the 
Mephistopheles theme, merely references earlier material and is no longer a driving force. 
Arppeggiations in the left hand and minimal accompanying textures maximize the vocal 
nature of the melody. The pianissimo marking at m. 124 (Example 9-11) is the first 
explicit indication of this particular dynamic hue in the score thus far. These aspects, 
taken together with the expressive marking dolce con grazia at m. 125, indicate a 
complete atmospheric change from the rather titanic forces at play previously to a far 
more vulnerable and human element. The overall musical effect engenders a sympathetic 
response of innocence and freedom in the listener 
 In sum, both human themes (Faust and Gretchen), although stated sequentially, 
are really connected respectively to supernatural themes (Mephistopheles/Almighty). 








Thematic Relationships and Dynamic Tension: 
Conceptual Implications of Sonata Design 
 
Using Faust as a paratext can certainly spice up discussions of musical character 
and interpretive meaning. Indeed, this appears to be the goal of many analyses that 
include extra-musical discussions. Using a paratext to increase the phenomenol gical 
intelligibility of the themes represents the foreground of the Faust-paratext application. 
However, if the discussion ends there, it limits the paratextual meaning to mere character-
sketches. In his Sonata in B minor, Liszt uses the Faust paratext to serve a more 
important background function. 
The polarity in Faust between the desires of the world (represented by 
Mephistopheles) and redemptive transcendence (represented by Gretchen) offers the 
dramatic tension necessary to sustain Faust’s yearning. Brown writes,  
 Once he is recognized to be a part of Nature, we can also see the  
sense in which Mephistopheles is truly an opponent. As the  
opponent of light he is the opponent of transcendence; he is the  
“world” pole in our Neoplatonic dialectic of world and mind, the  
realist in our real-ideal dichotomy.139 
 
By the middle of the nineteenth century, the Classical tonic-dominant polarity h d 
already been superseded by a more dissonant tonal language.140 In addition, the concept 
of simple polarity had also become more nuanced. Nineteenth-century composers shied 
away from linear absolutes, preferring instead the circular conundrum. The tension 
                                                
139 Jane K. Brown, Goethe’s Faust: The German Tragedy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 68. 
140 Indeed, Beethoven had already substituted chromatic mediants for dominant key areas in his sonatas Op. 
31, No. 1, and  Op. 53. 
95 
 
created by placing irreconcilable desires in dynamic tension with one another prov d far 
more useful to composers who were not aesthetically invested in the necessity of 
resolving oppositional forces. For his Sonata, Liszt needed to access a conceptual 
division that would create the massive tension needed to sustain a piece of such length 
and breadth. At the same time, he also needed to ensure that the conceptual division did 
not simply become mere polar opposition.  
The sonata contains four main thematic groups stemming from the opening 
material.141 In this way, all the themes are connected (and therefore part of one another) 
but are still set in tension with one another. While the Faustian theme and 
Mephistophelian theme have been previously discussed, any model simply trying to 
engender polarity between them does not take into account their symbiotic nature. In the 
first section of the Sonata, the Faust theme is stated in organic conjunction with the 
Mephistopheles theme. The clearest example is the passage mm. 263-318. The 
Mephistophelean identity (seen in the octave virtuosic styling and staccato articulation) 
begins to influence the Faust theme at m. 263 while maintaining its diabolical 
accompaniment underneath.  
                                                





Example 10-1: Mephistopheles/Faust Material mm.  262-276 
From mm. 263-296 the themes become knit together in the passagework and displaced by 
octave (mm. 270-276) until the only real vestige of the yearning Faust is in the harmonic 
and rhythmic stasis of the tremolo at m. 278. 142 
                                                
142 The rhythmic stability of the quarter-note/eighth-note values in the original statement in m. 157 (see 
example 9-7)  stand in sharp contrast to the more syncopated, Mephistophelian rhythmic values in mm 8-13 




Example 10-2: Faust Tremolo mm. 278-285 
 As the themes are symbiotic, the conceptual tension in the Sonata does not stem 
from the relationship between the Mephistopheles and Faust themes, but rather from thei  
relationship with the Almighty and Gretchen themes. The resolution of that tension is not 
accomplished in a Classical manner (the resolution of all thematic material to the tonic), 
but rather in the separation of the Faust theme from the Mephistopheles theme and 
subsequent attachment to the Gretchen-Almighty pairing. In this way, the resolution of 
the Faust theme parallels the redemption of Faust.  
In the first section, the Mephistopheles-Faust statement stands in contrast to he 
Gretchen-Almighty statement however, during the second section the Gretchen/Almighty 
material is paired with the Faust material (with no appearance of Mephistopheles’s 
material). The much more sensual music in this section has been compared to a love 
scene between Faust and Gretchen (which, by the way, offers another example of a 
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lyrical excerpt from the play). In terms of dynamic tension, the second section serves to 
separate Faust’s material from Mephistopheles’s material (albeit without any real 
resolution of Faust’s constant harmonic yearning).  The third section begins with a 
prominent diabolical display of virtuosity to reassert the primacy of the Mephistopheles 
material. After the Almighty thematic statement, however, the Faust theme is heard in 
place of the Gretchen material. The pairing has been changed to Almighty-Faus. 
Furthermore, there are no fresh statements of the Gretchen theme. The Gretchen material 
is not heard again until its restatement (out of the Andante sostenuto material) in the coda.  
 Why this particular use of the thematic material in the third section? Why not 
bring the Gretchen material back for the recapitulation? While the necessity of restating 
thematic material from the exposition had become (by this point in sonata aesthetics) 
much less urgent, the absence of the Gretchen material offers another link to Goethe’s 
Faust. Once Faust seduces Gretchen, she descends precipitously into madness as a reult 
of the following events: her role in her mother’s murder, Faust’s murder of her brother, 
the demonic torment set upon her at her realization of her illegitimate pregnancy, and her 
subsequent murder of her illegitimate child. Indeed, she is redeemed by her faith only 
hours before her execution. Subsequently, she is only heard from again in Act V at the 
end of the play (her death closes Part I of the play) when through her prayers she is 
enabled to redeem Faust from Mephistopheles. If the second section of the sonata is 
viewed as the love scene/affair between Faust and Gretchen, her role in any subsequent 
dramatic material must be severed to allow for her dramatic, transcendent re mption of 
Faust at the end of the work. The nearly exact restatement of the Faust-Gretchen material 
(from the middle section) during the coda at the end of the piece along with the final 
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resolution of the Faust material in the final measures, may be perceived as a direct
correlation with Goethe’s plot.  
 While one might assume a tidy set of oppositional relationships 
(Mephistopheles – Almighty, Faust – Gretchen), this is not the case. If the Gretchen 
theme is affecting the Faust theme so profoundly as to first tear it from the grasp of its 
Mephistopheles-Faust pairing, then place it into the Almighty-Faust pairing see  in the 
recapitulation, and finally to enable a resolution to Faust’s inherent, insatiable yearning, 
the Gretchen material must be seen as the pivotal thematic material around which the 
other themes orbit.  The pairings thus do not split along supernatural and natural lines, 
but rather radiate out from their relationship to the Gretchen material. As Mephistopheles 
and Gretchen both bear the most direct influence on Faust, their thematic outlines re ain 
the most similar shape. The Mephistopheles theme, however, does not really interact wi h 
the Gretchen theme (theirs is a proximal association) in the way it interacts with the Faust 
theme. The intense interaction among the Almighty, Faust, and Gretchen themes in the 
Andante sostenuto represents a sea change in the relational pairings and is the source 
material for the final resolution of the Faust theme. The relationships, when viewed over 
the course of the sonata, thus form something of a palindrome reflecting around Gretchen:  
Mephistopheles – Faust – Almighty – Gretchen – Faust – Almighty – Mephistopheles. 
Faust only gains redemption from the Almighty through Gretchen, who in turn is 
only ever corrupted by Mephistopheles through Faust. It is Gretchen’s abilityto n effect 
redeem herself (through returning to her original state) after her corrupti n that makes her 
unique. She in turn is able to bring about Faust’s redemption and banish Mephistopheles 
from Faust once again to the realm of the supernatural. 
100 
 
 In sum, the musical relationships reflect the paratextual relationships. The initial 
tension in the first section between the Mephistopheles-Faust pairing and the Almighty-
Gretchen pairing, is redrawn in the second section to allow the Faust theme to resolve in 









A theme with extra-musical connotations requires the responsibility to maintain 
fidelity to both specifically musical considerations and the myriad qualities of the 
theme’s character. To repeat once more Liszt’s statement:  
In program music… the return, change, modification, and  
modulation of the motives are conditioned by their relation  
to a poetic idea… All exclusively musical considerations,  
though they should not be neglected, have to be  
subordinated to the action of the given subject.143  
 
As argued in the previous chapter, the themes in Liszt’s Sonata in B minor are 
identifiable not only as thematic material, but also as characters in Goethe’s Faust. The 
musical relationships between themes parallel the Faust characters’ relationships to each 
other. According to Claudio Arrau (whose teacher was Martin Krause, a Liszt student), 
the Faustian scenario was “taken for granted among Liszt’s pupils.”144 If the character 
relationships condition the thematic relationships, the large-scale structure providing the 
context for thematic/character development must also be similarly conditioned by the 
poetic idea. The macro-organization of form and time should reflect the micro-
organization of themes and characters. 
Many Liszt aficionados prefer to view the Sonata from the more abstract (and 
artistically defensible) perspective of absolute music. Many excellent analyses have been 
offered that reveal Liszt’s keen, sophisticated sense of compositional form and structure. 
                                                
143 Quoted in: Frederich Niecks, Programme Music in the Last Four Centuries: A Contribution to the 
History of Musical Expression, 280-81 . 
144 Joseph Horowitz, Arrau on Music and Performance, 137. 
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Indeed, the Sonata has become something of a counterweight for Liszt’s more 
aesthetically controversial works. Yet the purer structural debate over Liszt’s 
compositional rigor and the existence of a “double-form” perhaps misses the mark when 
it comes to interpretation. While the Sonata may be analyzed according to rigorous, 
architectural sonata models, do such models account for the highly emotional (indeed
melodramatic) character of the piece? The tone of the Sonata certainly is not soberly 
philosophical and is light-years away from the traditional harmonic-thematic drama of 
sonata form. 
The assignment of paratextual meaning implies a certain narrative. Liszt’s sonata, 
however, does not take a traditionally sequential narrative shape. At first glance, the 
chimerical form of the piece defies any comprehensive paratextual analysis (leaving one 
to a strict study of compositional tools and procedures). Any paratextual analysis of the 
Sonata in B minor must account for inherent formal contradictions, among which are: 
cyclical sonata design, a heavily revised score prone to spectacular effects, multiple 
thematic groups, and a cellular, non-linear thematic design. If one accepts the influence 
of Goethe’s Faust both formally and metaphysically, however, the formal structure 
begins to demonstrate remarkable parallels.  
The formal organization of the Sonata, while retaining some classically traditional 
formal elements, does not take a conventional shape. The formal structure as describe  
by Rosen is “four movements – allegro, adagio, scherzo, and finale – compressed into a 
single sonata movement with exposition, development, and recapitulation.”145 (Others 
have divided the sections into three parts: Allegro-Adagio-Allegro.)146 While the one-
                                                
145 Charles Rosen, The Romantic Generation, 480. 
146 The controversy of the double-form analysis was previously mentioned in the Literature Review.  
103 
 
movement-sonata concept does eliminate the need to maintain a specific continuity 
throughout disparate movements, there are certain formal consequences in doingso. The 
lack of strong sectional contexts (separate movements) for the musical material thr atens 
to weaken the thematic elements’ formal organization. The dissolving of sonata 
boundaries greatly increases the possibility that the sonata form will simp y disintegrate 
into a fantasy. A cyclical form also potentially negates formal and emotional direction, as 
no linear formal move from dissonance to consonance can take place. In a cyclical form, 
the exposition need not necessarily be worked out through development and resolved 
through recapitulation: the expositional material may be simply restated after an absence.   
Interestingly, the sonata-within-sonata (double-form) device inherent to Liszt’s 
one-movement forms bears a striking resemblance to the play-within-play device 
established in Faust. The play-within-play  strives to displace perception through the 
paradoxical placement of its characters in the role of actor and audience. In a play, the 
contrived reality of the actors is bound by the conditional reality allowed by the audience. 
One of these conditions is that the line between actor and audience remain firmly 
established. Otherwise the experience of the contrived reality by the audience becomes 
the experience of reality.  The perceptual quandary of an actor playing an actor, or the 
actor playing an audience member (onstage), can be useful in providing additional 
bulwarks to the audience’s willing participation in the contrived reality necessary to 
sustain the conditional reality.  
At first glance the sonata-within-sonata seems to parallel the play-within-play. 
However, Liszt’s sonata-within-sonata form does not demonstrate the sleight-of-hand 
necessary to diffuse the listener’s pre-established perspective of the piece as a sonata. 
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Because the listener is not granted sufficient formal delineation to make the quantum leap 
between formal macro-elements and micro-elements, the lines distinguishi  the large-
scale form (exposition-development-recapitulation) from the small-scale cyc ical form 
(allegro, adagio, scherzo, and finale) become blurred. The resulting formal twiligh  serves 
to further dissolve conventional sonata architecture. The sonata is not heard as a double-
form, which would require an interrelated construction of both micro and macro formal 
structures, but rather as a series of episodic events organized according to so ata 
principles.  
To gain profitably from an architectural model for the Sonata in B minor, one 
must take into account its construction through episodic, non-narrative elements. 
Fortunately, the structure of Faust provides a precedent.  
Jane Brown observes: 
  In the same way, plot structure does not involve the standard  
Aristotelian categories of peripety (or reversal), catastrophe,  
or unity. Not only the unities of time and place but also the  
more fundamental unity of action are frequently ignored.  
Such drama is, in other words, episodic, and the connection  
between episodes is more at the level of theme than at the  
superficial level of story line.147 
 
The classical sonata before Beethoven maintained a necessary diatonic tension 
across the space-time of sonata movements while providing large-scale patterns 
organizing the collected movements into a cohesive entity. In first movement sonata form, 
the dominant-tonic148 dissonance driving the exposition through the development to the 
                                                
147 Jane Brown, Goethe’s Faust: The German Tragedy, 22. 
148 While many composers sought to substitute different harmonies for the dominant once it had lost its 
potency as a polarizing factor, new harmonies were still in effect substitutions. 
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culminating recapitulation was a fundamental force.149 The polarity of dissonant key 
areas (catastrophe) needed to be reconciled to the tonic (unity). Additionally the large-
scale four-movement pattern (Allegro-Adagio-Scherzo-Rondo) provided character 
dissonance reconciled by symmetrical balances. The dramatic (potential) drive of the 
Allegro was generally countered by a largely kinetic drive in the Rondo. The seriou , 
introspective Adagio (sobriety) often balanced an extroverted, lighter Schrzo (levity). 
The audience of the time recognized these forces and the meta-cognition of these events 
provided formal landmarks in both philosophically abstract and emotionally theatrical 
material. With Beethoven, these formal landmarks served as both narrative elements and 
organically unifying devices providing perceptual boundaries as well as definitions of 
time and space. These formal elements offered the audience reference points with  the 
dramatic atmosphere of the work. As Liszt both revered Beethoven and studied with 
Beethoven’s most prominent pupil Carl Czerny, he must have been aware of these forc . 
Yet he was also part of the generation of post-Beethoven Romantics wanting to forge a 
different path.  
Liszt’s attraction to the Faust formal model was threefold. The episodic nature of 
the plot freed potential musical representation from any sequential chronology. Such 
freedom offered him complete expressive license in creating thematically represented 
characters without the baggage of narrative events or preexisting laws of cause and effect. 
Goethe places his protagonist and antagonist against the constantly shifting sand of 
history as well as maintaining a very flexible contemporaneous reality. While both Faust 
and Mephistopheles may be involved in surrounding events, these events are never 
                                                
149 For a more complete discussion of energetics as a met phor see: Lee Rothfarb, “Energetics,” The 
Cambridge History of Western Music Theory, ed. Thomas Christensen (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 927-55. 
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allowed to fundamentally alter either their identities or destinies. Rather, the events and 
places revolve around the focal point of Faust’s relationship to Mephistopheles. 
 Secondly, because Faust’s and Mephistopheles’s relationship serves as the focal 
point of their reality, their narrative loses any linear, chronological grounding. This 
kaleidoscopic approach to episodic form diffuses any sense of return, progress, or 
distance. Instead of the characters being defined by their journey from a particular point 
to a particular goal (tension-resolution), the characters become defined simply through 
their consistency against constantly changing contexts. Liszt’s tendency to use thematic 
transformation techniques as developmental offers a similar musical design. In the play, 
the audience gains insight and perspective on Faust through the shifting contexts f time 
and space. While Liszt does not use thematic transformation techniques to signify a 
movement from the diabolical to the sacred, he does use thematic transformation to give 
the listener perspective and insight into the nature of the theme through shifting muscal 
contexts. Lastly, Liszt’s use of the Sonata’s opening thematic material as not only a 
unifying device, but also the fundamental material from which all subsequent themes are 
created points to an understanding and appreciation of thematic organization in Faust. 
Faust’s pact with Mephistopheles also provides insight into the sonata’s formal
design. Faust receives anything he wants provided he continually desires more than h  
receives. The instant his desire is sated (or he asks relief from his desire), he will die and 
Mephistopheles will collect his soul. This pact becomes an inversion of the conception of 
death as a cessation of striving. The insatiable desire of Faust is rather an antidote to 
death – a format for immortality – and is the driving force behind not only the drama’s 
events but also the very fabric of time and space. Liszt capitalizes on this driving esire 
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and creates a sonata without formal breaks between movements or sections. Formal 
arrival points (such as the introduction of new themes) are mixed with the downbeat of 
the next phrase so the harmony performs double duty as both resolution and new 
beginning (as seen for example at m. 32).   
 
Example 11-1: Cadence/Arrival mm. 31-32 
Any fermatas in the piece are destabilized either through their placement over 
rests or a dissonant harmony. The refusal to allow any true harmonic respite generates a 
sense of insatiable yearning in sharp contrast to a Beethovenian organic, linear tension. 
Through both minimal thematic ingredients and a continuous redefining of the harmonic 
atmosphere, Liszt manages to keep the sonata in a paradoxical state of static movement. 
Because any new themes are built from previous material, all subsequent themes aft r the 
opening have the ring of déjà vu. All points of arrival are instantaneously morphed to 
points of departure through both chromatic modulation and ambiguous shared chords. 
Indeed, in the entire Sonata, the only definitive movement from tension to resolution 
occurs in the final measures.   
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Aside from the fundamental elements of the cyclical episodic form, there still 
exists the problem of resolving opposing elements within a cyclical form. Once the 
formal (tonic-dominant) dissonance of thematic key areas is dissolved, so also is the 
ability to reconcile the two themes. Arguably one might achieve nothing more than an 
endless thematic prizefight. Cyclical forms are comfortable with multiple themes and 
create no need to reconcile their existence into a tonicized, linear entity. As c clical 
arguments create no solution, a cyclical form needs to create no resolution. Sonatas are 
fundamentally linear constructions however, and must achieve some end to the matter 
through a resolution (usually worked out through the development) of the dissonant 
material.  Liszt’s solution in this sonata lies in his unifying device of thematic 
transformation. For Liszt, the idea of thematic transformation involves far more than a 
theme masquerading through different contexts. Unique to Liszt is the use of thematic 
transformation to reveal inner truths about the theme.  Thematic transformation generates 
a sense of revelation. The true nature of the theme is revealed through the systematic 
exploration of its character in relation with the surrounding contextual music. Seldom is a 
Liszt theme ill dressed for the occasion. Indeed, the thematic inner nature is better 
perceived through its comfort with a wide variety of musical textures, emotions, and 
landscapes than through either distillation (as in Beethoven) or an intuitive perception of 
a sub-conscious, unifying spirit (Schumann). Through thematic transformation, Liszt 
redefines the development by shifting contexts around the theme. Thus the demands of 
both cyclical stasis and linear progress are satisfied. The thematic material is not 
fundamentally altered (recapitulation does not define a point of linear arrival), yet the 
audience’s perception of the theme does change (satisfying the necessity of thematic 
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development). Faust demonstrates a parallel inasmuch as Mephistopheles and Faust do 
not change either, while the audience’s understanding of them does.150   
 
Cyclical Forms: Cause and Effect 
 
 
If the Faust model resolves conceptual difficulties in both episodic formal 
construction and thematic nature and development, what might it say about the cyclical
aspects of Liszt’s form? While first movement sonata form maintains some cyclical 
elements, these elements tend to remain subservient to the large-scale linear mov ment 
from tension to resolution. The formal ambiguity of Liszt’s Sonata, however, blurs these 
boundaries considerably.    
Goethe’s description of Faust as a tragedy reflects a similar problem. Brown 
writes,   
Thus the term [tragedy] immediately evokes a series of  
categories that are still in common use: hero, innocent suffering,  
fate, tragic flaw, guilt and repentance, reversal, catastrophe. . .  
Faust contains, without doubt, such a tragedy of passion in the  
Gretchen sequence; but what is strange is that Faust contains so  
much besides that is often difficult to connect to this quintessential 
love tragedy, not least the ultimate salvation of the hero.151 
 
The reversal of categories that would allow for Faust’s redemption mirrors the dramatic 
problem of the sonata recapitulation. A standard recapitulation takes themes that had 
previously been categorized as being in disagreement and re-categorizes them a  b ing in 
agreement. However, as Brown points out, Faust contains a great deal more than the 
sequential exploration of categories that would mark a linear tragedy.  
                                                
150 Excluding, of course, Faust’s final redemption. 
151 Jane Brown, Goethe’s Faust: The German Tragedy, 15-16. 
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A linear conception of tragedy requires a certain link between cause and effect. 
The recapitulation in sonata form employs rules of cause and effect as well. As Liszt does 
not concern himself with providing a sequential narrative of thematic events, the linear 
drive required to produce a dramatic effect at the Recapitulation is missing. Likewise, as 
God demands no account of Faust’s actions and he is redeemed from his pact with 
Mephistopheles by the prayers of Gretchen, the actions of Faust prove to have no bearing 
on his eventual end. This lack of large-scale, moral consequence for Faust proves to be 
one of the more tantalizing links between the play and sonata.  
 In Beethoven, especially during his middle and late periods, a moral quality to his 
sonatas and symphonies emerges and changes over time. The grand heroic striving of he 
Apassionata and the Fifth Symphony give way to the transcendent late works such as the 
late piano sonatas and the late string quartets. All may be described as containing a moral 
compass rewarding the heroic striving with transcendental peace.  
 Faust has no such moral compass to his actions, however, as his main aim 
according to Brown “is not to avoid sin; it is to accept the temptations of the devil as fast 
as he can.”152 This is not to say his decisions do not have moral consequences; the 
consequences are simply deferred to others. Gretchen’s forfeited life and nr amnation, 
the deaths of Gretchen’s brother and the old couple are directly due to Faust’s hand, as 
well as many other deaths Faust causes indirectly. These events, however, are micro-
results of Faust’s striving and in no way alter the macro-result, Faust’s ultimate 
redemption. Indeed, one could reorder all the events or even cut many of them out and 
still retain the same ultimate result. There is no moral sum to be found in Faust’s ctions 
as they have no bearing on his eventual salvation.  
                                                
152 Jane Brown, Goethe’s Faust: The German Tragedy, 80. 
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 In Liszt’s sonata, the Andante sostenuto exists apart from the Mephistopheles 
material both in the middle section and the final coda. This disjunctive property enables 
the Faust material to break free of the Mephistophelean moorings without coming t a y 
self-awareness. Neither the reassertion of Mephistolean virtuosity (the primary catalyst) 
in the recapitulation nor developmental striving or thematic transformation brings about 
the final transcendent resolution. Rather, the musical reminiscence in the coda of material 
from the Andante sostenuto simply changes the existing parameters and becomes the new 
reality. Faust’s unhinged moral license ensures the play remains free from any burden of 
relational cause and effect. In the Sonata, this translates to a formal freedom from 
reconciling expositional dissonances in the recapitulation.  
Freedom from moral consequence is only possible if Time does not exist as a 
continuous sequential stream. In Faust, Time reveals itself to be an extremely variable 
commodity. Not only does Faust freely unfetter his desire from the shackles of time (as 
regards his affair with Helen of Troy), but the nature of his bargain with Mephisto eles 
ensures there is no chronological stacking of events ultimately leading to a foregone end. 
Faust is not undone by some subtle character flaw; he leaps toward his doom with 
reckless abandon. His redemption comes as a surprise to all (not least Mephistophele ) 
and ignores the consequences of Faust’s behavior.  
On a macro level, time is measured in events. The rise and fall of empires, 
cultures and ideas as well as physical birth and death all become mileposts by which life 
is measured. These macro events in turn are measured in terms of linear micro-events 
progressing towards a predetermined end. Age is measured through the biological 
processes of maturation and decay. Good and Evil are measured through specific actions 
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towards a given goal (circumstances for example decide whether death is cons dered 
murder, manslaughter, accidental, natural etc.). The perception of time in music works in 
a very similar fashion. In sonata form the exposition is measured through the advent of 
primary and secondary themes and the establishment of dissonant tonal centers. The 
development is generally tracked through a linear progression of modulation, 
fragmentation, and augmentation to the defining event of first movement sonata form: the 
recapitulation. The exposition leads logically to the development, development to 
recapitulation, recapitulation to final resolution. In Faust, since there are no personal 
repercussions to Faust’s actions, no moral debits or credits, no accumulation of events 
towards a particular goal, Time ceases linear existence and becomes cyclically defined by 
Faust’s perpetual-motion machination of desire.  
The formal implications for the Sonata regarding time are directly correlated to 
the use of time in Faust. The sonata is a one-movement, cyclical work. As the four main 
thematic centers are all derived from the opening material, there are no t ue thematic 
contrasts and therefore the introduction of “new” thematic areas cannot stand as true 
measures of time. The recapitulation, instead of offering a resolution, merely r asserts the 
dissonance of the opening material and the control of the Mephistopheles theme. Nothing 
has fundamentally changed regarding the status quo. This is not to say there are no 
differences, but the recapitulation event does not arrive through an inexorable, linear 
stacking of events within the development just as the development did not arrive through 
a linear event series within the exposition. The sonata is non-narrative and as such the 
episodes within the sonata morph into one another rather than traversing a predestined 
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formal path. The formal events in this sonata do not follow a linear dramatic track but 









Much has been written of Liszt’s reckless virtuosity, élan, and technical bravura. 
As Dana Gooley writes, “[Liszt] made virtuosity an agonistic spectacle of domination 
and triumph that invited listeners to imagine the performance as a battle, the virtuoso as a 
valiant warrior.”153 If the Faust paratext can provide interpretive inspiration, perhaps it 
can also offer suggestions on virtuosic character.  
If Liszt viewed virtuosity as “battle,” then intensely virtuosic textures in the 
sonata may correspond to violence in Faust. As the Mephistopheles theme is given the 
most virtuosic textures in the sonata, one might additionally conclude that the episodes of 
virtuosity (opportunities for an “agonistic spectacle of domination and triumph”) in the 
sonata may coincide with episodes of Mephistophelean violence in the play. 
Mephistopheles, however, only personally engages in one episode of physical violence. 
Furthermore, while the nature of that physical violence may indeed offer the performer an 
approach to the virtuosic demands, the approach may be quite different from the one 
advocated by Gooley.  
The episode in question concerns a duel between Gretchen’s brother Valentine 
and Faust. An honorable soldier, Valentine defends his sister’s lost chastity by attacking 
Faust and Mephistopheles as they approach to seduce Gretchen for a second night. 
Mephistopheles calmly parries the attacks of Valentine, prompting him to cry out: 
 
                                                
153 Dana Gooley, “Warhorses: Liszt, Weber’s ‘Konzertstück,’ and the Cult of Napoléon,” 19th-Century 
Music, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer, 2000): 62. 
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            Is he the devil or what? 
  What’s this? My hand’s already lamed.154 
 
Faust then strikes at Mephistopheles’s command, dealing a mortal wound to Valentine. In 
this duel Mephistopheles, whose technical mastery requires not the slightest exertion, 
outclasses both Valentine’s anger and (presumably prodigious) physical prowess. Indeed, 
the imperative violence of Valentine’s lines (Then parry that!)155 is the polar opposite of 
the bemused response of Mephistopheles (Why not, why not?).156 While Valentine 
employs strength, Mephistopheles’s reliance on finesse provides possibly the most 
immediately applicable literary parallel between Faust and the sonata – the nature of 
Mephistopheles’ virtuosity.  
The Maitre d’Armes157 Raoul Clery writes, “Sometimes in the past they 
characterized the talent of the great [fencing] masters by the expression, "hand of iron, 
arm of rubber."”158 In an attempt to express the supreme diabolical power of 
Mephistopheles, many performers rely on sheer muscular domination of the sonata’s 
virtuosic passagework. While the physical approach does achieve a certain effect, it does 
so at the expense of expressing the surreptitious deviltry of Mephistopheles. 
Mephistopheles, however powerful he may be, never merely overwhelms his opponents. 
Such crude behavior would be akin to Iago merely challenging Othello to a duel in the 
first act. Mephistopheles rather delights in devious subterfuge to achieve his ends. Any 
performer who allows a Mephistophelean meaning to the primary theme would do well t
                                                
154 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Faust, 115. 
155 Ibid., 114. 
156 Ibid.. 
157 Title held by a classical fencing master. 
158 Raoul Clery, A Propos d’un Accident, Trans. Mary Anne Stevens (Reprint, 




also let the character of Mephistopheles’ virtuosity inform his decisions regardin  
virtuoso demands within the sonata.  
Franz Liszt was known for being a man of many paradoxes: iconic virtuoso, 
aspiring musicological scholar, world traveler, Master-teacher, charlatan, Abbé, alleged 
playboy, and philanthropist. With such a variety of paradoxical descriptions of the man, it 
remains no wonder that his music should enjoy the same polarized opinions. Whether a 
biography polemically favors or derides Liszt, his compositions and especially the Sonata 
in B minor often bear an Atlas-worthy responsibility. Declare his major works pinnacles 
of the literature, establish them as heralds of a new conception in music, and one must 
absolve Liszt the man of the rather embarrassing Jolly Roger flying from his standards. 
Conversely, strip the major works of their worth by focusing on examples of vulgarity, 
paucity of invention, and swashbuckling élan, and unfairly relegate Liszt and his music to 
the grab bag of nineteenth century virtuosi whose legacy left little more than asour taste 
in the mouths of most contemporary scholars, critics, and composers. 
 The great paradox of Liszt’s music stems from the comfortable duality of certain 
vulgarities within his best and most important major works. These licenses are balanced 
by a tremendous restraint and refinement in many of his late, minor works. Rosen writes, 
“Liszt may be compared to an old ancestor who built up the family fortune by 
disreputable and shameful transactions in his youth and spent his last years in works of 
charity.”159 Liszt’s additional propensity for programmatic elements offers yet another 
balancing act. While scholarly musical analysis is imperative in understanding Liszt’s 
output, theoretical descriptions and analyses seem to offer little help in addressing the 
                                                
159 Charles Rosen, The Romantic Generation, 474. 
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more abstract (but just as conceptually important) forces of both literature and Liszt’s 
own personality on his work.  
The Sonata in B minor has assumed a prominent place among Liszt’s piano works 
and indeed remains a prime example of his innovations with one-movement sonata form. 
Liszt heavily revised the sonata and the compositional carelessness evident in some of his 
other works is noticeably lacking. While there are certainly theatrical effects present, 
Liszt was careful to keep theatrical effect from transcending substance. However, while 
carefully knit together, the final product remains conceived on such an epic scale it can 
leave the listener (as well as the performer) skeptical at best and suspicious at worst. 
Indeed, the performer must often guard against the sweeping tumult of passagework as 
the music continually threatens to degenerate into a tawdry spectacle of virtuosic, 
emotional display. The argument over whether the piece falls under the auspices of 
absolute or program music perhaps misses the point. Labeling a piece of music “absolute” 
or “programmatic” involves making a value judgment. Liszt’s Sonata in B minor, 
whatever its absolute or paratextual bonafides, resides solidly within the realm of serious 
music written for serious pianists and musical connoisseurs. As such, all of the elements 
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Example 1: Longyear’s measure
  
 
                                            




-by-measure chart of the Sonata in B minor















Example 2: Newman’s Chart of Franz Liszt’s Sonata in B minor.162 
Newman describes his labels as follows:  
 M., T., S., and K. [stands] for main theme, transition, second  
 theme, and closing theme; the arrow, again, for tonal flux;  
 and the symbols v, w, x, y, and z, for the thematic elements  
 and their transformations (with the horizaontal spaces  
 indicating thematic extension and the symbols w/x or x/w  
 meaning the interplay of two elements. “Sonatina form”  
 refers to “Sonata Form” in which a simple retransition  
 (“T.”) replaces the development section.163 
 
                                                
162 William S. Newman, The Sonata Since Beethoven, A History of the Sonata Idea 374-5. 


















                                                
164 Ben Arnold, “Piano Music: 1835-1861,” 121. 
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165 Ben Arnold, “Piano Music: 1835-1861,” 122. 
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167 Sharon Winklhofer, Liszt’s Sonata in B Minor: A Study of Autography Sources and Documents, 131- 42. 
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Example 6: Hamilton’s comparative chart of the Sonata in B minor.168 
 
  
                                                




Selection from Arnold’s TABLE 3: Liszt’s Reading in German.169 
  
                                                













Allegro energico Andante sostenuto Allegro energico Andante sostenuto 
exposition development rhetorical 
recapitulation170 
























M: Mephistopheles material 
MA: Mephistophelean parody of Almighty material 
A: Almighty material 
G: Gretchen material 
F: Faust material  
 
                                                
170 While this is a return of the Mephistopheles materi l, it is not a full recapitulation. Rather, it describes a 
rhetorical event in keeping with the formal outlines of first-movement sonata form. The full, formal 
recapitulation is a structural event taking place in the third section. 
